(1) Findings Congress finds that
(A) section
2210 of this title (commonly known as the Price-Anderson Act)
(i) provides a predictable legal framework necessary for nuclear projects; and
(ii) ensures prompt and equitable compensation in the event of a nuclear incident in the United States;
(B) the Price-Anderson Act, in effect, provides operators of nuclear powerplants with insurance for damage arising out of a nuclear incident and funds the insurance primarily through the assessment of a retrospective premium from each operator after the occurrence of a nuclear incident;
(C) the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997, will establish a global system
(i) to provide a predictable legal framework necessary for nuclear energy projects; and
(ii) to ensure prompt and equitable compensation in the event of a nuclear incident;
(D) the Convention benefits United States nuclear suppliers that face potentially unlimited liability for nuclear incidents that are not covered by the Price-Anderson Act by replacing a potentially open-ended liability with a predictable liability regime that, in effect, provides nuclear suppliers with insurance for damage arising out of such an incident;
(E) the Convention also benefits United States nuclear facility operators that may be publicly liable for a Price-Anderson incident by providing an additional early source of funds to compensate damage arising out of the Price-Anderson incident;
(F) the combined operation of the Convention, the Price-Anderson Act, and this section will augment the quantity of assured funds available for victims in a wider variety of nuclear incidents while reducing the potential liability of United States suppliers without increasing potential costs to United States operators;
(G) the cost of those benefits is the obligation of the United States to contribute to the supplementary compensation fund established by the Convention;
(H) any such contribution should be funded in a manner that does not
(i) upset settled expectations based on the liability regime established under the Price-Anderson Act; or
(ii) shift to Federal taxpayers liability risks for nuclear incidents at foreign installations;
(I) with respect to a Price-Anderson incident, funds already available under the Price-Anderson Act should be used; and
(J) with respect to a nuclear incident outside the United States not covered by the Price-Anderson Act, a retrospective premium should be prorated among nuclear suppliers relieved from potential liability for which insurance is not available.
(2) Purpose The purpose of this section is to allocate the contingent costs associated with participation by the United States in the international nuclear liability compensation system established by the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997
(A) with respect to a Price-Anderson incident, by using funds made available under section
2210 of this title to cover the contingent costs in a manner that neither increases the burdens nor decreases the benefits under section
2210 of this title; and
(B) with respect to a covered incident outside the United States that is not a Price-Anderson incident, by allocating the contingent costs equitably, on the basis of risk, among the class of nuclear suppliers relieved by the Convention from the risk of potential liability resulting from any covered incident outside the United States.
