Part A - Stockpile Stewardship and Weapons Production

50 USC 2521 - Stockpile stewardship program

(a) Establishment 
The Secretary of Energy shall establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and certification.
(b) Program elements 
The program shall include the following:
(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with respect to the detonation of nuclear weapons.
(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research.
(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.
(c) Authorization of appropriations 
Of funds authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Energy for fiscal year 1994 for weapons activities, $157,400,000 shall be available for the stewardship program established under subsection (a).

50 USC 2522 - Report on stockpile stewardship criteria

(a) Requirement for criteria 
The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging whether the science-based tools being used by the Department of Energy for determining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are performing in a manner that will provide an adequate degree of certainty that the stockpile is safe and reliable.
(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense 
The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense.
(c) Report 
Not later than March 1, 2000, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the efforts by the Department of Energy to develop the criteria required by subsection (a). The report shall include
(1) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable and the relationship of the science-based tools to the collection of that information; and
(2) a description of the criteria required by subsection (a) to the extent they have been developed as of the date of the submission of the report.

50 USC 2523 - Plan for stewardship, management, and certification of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile

(a) Plan requirement 
The Secretary of Energy shall develop and annually update a plan for maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, and program direction and shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most recent annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
(b) Plan elements 
The plan and each update of the plan shall set forth the following:
(1) The number of warheads (including active and inactive warheads) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) The current age of each warhead type, and any plans for stockpile lifetime extensions and modifications or replacement of each warhead type.
(3) The process by which the Secretary of Energy is assessing the lifetime, and requirements for lifetime extension or replacement, of the nuclear and nonnuclear components of the warheads (including active and inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(4) The process used in recertifying the safety, security, and reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(5) Any concerns which would affect the ability of the Secretary of Energy to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads).
(c) Annual submission of plan to Congress 
The Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress the plan developed under subsection (a) not later than March 15, 1998, and shall submit an updated version of the plan not later than May 1 of each year thereafter. The plan shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.

50 USC 2524 - Nuclear weapons stockpile life extension program

(a) Program required 
The Secretary of Energy shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, carry out a program to provide for the extension of the effective life of the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(b) Administrative responsibility for program 

(1) The program under subsection (a) shall be carried out through the element of the Department of Energy with responsibility for defense programs.
(2) For each budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the amounts requested for the program shall be clearly identified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of that budget.

50 USC 2524a - Reliable Replacement Warhead program

(a) Program required 
The Secretary of Energy shall carry out a program, to be known as the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which will have the following objectives:
(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing.
(3) To remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the maximum extent feasible and consistent with the objective specified in paragraph (2), components that are well understood or are certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing.
(4) To ensure that the nuclear weapons infrastructure can respond to unforeseen problems, to include the ability to produce replacement warheads that are safer to manufacture, more cost-effective to produce, and less costly to maintain than existing warheads.
(5) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile based on increased reliability of the reliable replacement warheads.
(6) To use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear complex to develop reliable replacement components to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile.
(7) To serve as a complement to, and potentially a more cost-effective and reliable long-term replacement for, the current Stockpile Life Extension Programs.
(b) Consultation 
The Secretary of Energy shall carry out the Reliable Replacement Warhead program in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.

50 USC 2525 - Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condition of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile

(a) Annual assessments required 
For each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile of the United States, each official specified in subsection (b) on an annual basis shall, to the extent such official is directly responsible for the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness of that nuclear weapon type, complete an assessment of the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness (as the case may be) of that nuclear weapon type.
(b) Covered officials 
The officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following:
(1) The head of each national security laboratory.
(2) The commander[1] of the United States Strategic Command.
(c) Use of teams of experts for assessments 
The head of each national security laboratory shall establish and use one or more teams of experts, known as red teams, to assist in the assessments required by subsection (a). Each such team shall include experts from both of the other national security laboratories. Each such team for a national security laboratory shall
(1) review the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory;
(2) subject such matters to challenge; and
(3) submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory.
(d) Report on assessments 
Not later than December 1 of each year, each official specified in subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary concerned, and to the Nuclear Weapons Council, a report on the assessments that such official was required by subsection (a) to complete. The report shall include the following:
(1) The results of each such assessment.
(2) 
(A) Such officials determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so
(i) an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and
(ii) a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues.
(B) An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests.
(C) Such officials determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so.
(3) In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory
(A) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments;
(B) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 2532 of this title to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments; and
(C) a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (c) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations.
(4) In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types.
(5) An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments.
(e) Submittals to the President and Congress 

(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the President
(A) each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (d) during the preceding year;
(B) any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report;
(C) the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and
(D) any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate.
(2) Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate.
(f) Classified form 
Each submittal under subsection (e) shall be in classified form only, with the classification level required for each portion of such submittal marked appropriately.
(g) Definitions 
In this section:
(1) The term national security laboratory has the meaning given such term in section 2471 of this title.
(2) The term Secretary concerned means
(A) the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and
(B) the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.
(h) First submissions 

(1) The first submissions made under subsection (d) shall be the submissions required to be made in 2003.
(2) The first submissions made under subsection (e) shall be the submissions required to be made in 2004.
[1] So in original. Probably should be capitalized.

50 USC 2526 - Form of certifications regarding the safety or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile

Any certification submitted to the President by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy regarding confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type in the United States nuclear weapons stockpile shall be submitted in classified form only.

50 USC 2527 - Nuclear test ban readiness program

(a) Findings 
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On September 17, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that they would resume full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on issues relating to nuclear testing, including further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
(2) It was agreed that the first step in these negotiations would be to reach agreement on verification measures that will make possible the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.
(3) To achieve the agreement on verification measures, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at the test sites of each country during the summer of 1988.
(4) At the Moscow summit in May 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to negotiations on effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process.
(b) Establishment of program 
The Secretary of Energy shall establish and support a program to assure that the United States is in a position to maintain the reliability, safety, and continued deterrent effect of its stockpile of existing nuclear weapons designs in the event that a low-threshold or comprehensive ban on nuclear explosives testing is negotiated and ratified within the framework agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union.
(c) Purposes of program 
The purposes of the program under subsection (b) shall be the following:
(1) To assure that the United States maintains a vigorous program of stockpile inspection and non-explosive testing so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban is entered into, the United States remains able to detect and identify potential problems in stockpile reliability and safety in existing designs of nuclear weapons.
(2) To assure that the specific materials, components, processes, and personnel needed for the remanufacture of existing nuclear weapons or the substitution of alternative nuclear warheads are available to support such remanufacture or substitution if such action becomes necessary in order to satisfy reliability and safety requirements under a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement.
(3) To assure that a vigorous program of research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering is supported so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement is entered into, the United States is able to maintain a base of technical knowledge about nuclear weapons design and nuclear weapons effects.
(d) Conduct of program 
The Secretary of Energy shall carry out the program provided for in subsection (b). The program shall be carried out with the participation of representatives of the Department of Defense, the nuclear weapons production facilities, and the national nuclear weapons laboratories.

50 USC 2528 - Study on nuclear test readiness postures

(a) Report 
Not later than February 15, 1996, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on the costs, programmatic issues, and other issues associated with sustaining the capability of the Department of Energy
(1) to conduct an underground nuclear test 6 months after the date on which the President determines that such a test is necessary to ensure the national security of the United States;
(2) to conduct such a test 18 months after such date; and
(3) to conduct such a test 36 months after such date.
(b) Biennial update report 

(1) Not later than February 15 of each odd-numbered year, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an update of the report required under subsection (a), as updated by any report previously submitted under this paragraph.
(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, as of the date of such report, the following:
(A) A list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are essential to carry out underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site.
(B) A list and description of the infrastructure and physical plant that are essential to carry out underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site.
(C) A description of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities described in subparagraph (A) and of the infrastructure and physical plant described in subparagraph (B).
(3) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

50 USC 2528a - Readiness posture for resumption by the United States of underground nuclear weapons tests

(a) Readiness posture required 
Commencing not later than October 1, 2006, the Secretary of Energy shall achieve, and thereafter maintain, a readiness posture of not more than 18 months for resumption by the United States of underground tests of nuclear weapons.
(b) Description of requirement 
For purposes of this section, a readiness posture of not more than 18 months for resumption by the United States of underground tests of nuclear weapons is achieved when the Department of Energy has the capability to resume such tests, if directed by the President to resume such tests, not later than 18 months after the date on which the President so directs.

50 USC 2529 - Requirements for specific request for new or modified nuclear weapons

(a) Requirement for request for funds for development 

(1) In any fiscal year after fiscal year 2002 in which the Secretary of Energy plans to carry out activities described in paragraph (2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon, the Secretary shall specifically request funds for such activities in the budget of the President for that fiscal year under section 1105 (a) of title 31.
(2) The activities described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development which could lead to the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.
(B) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.
(C) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development which could lead to the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.
(D) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.
(b) Budget request format 
The Secretary shall include in a request for funds under subsection (a) the following:
(1) In the case of funds for activities described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of subsection (a)(2), a single dedicated line item for all such activities for new nuclear weapons or modified nuclear weapons that are in phase 1, 2, or 2A or phase 6.1, 6.2, or 6.2A (as the case may be), or any concept work prior to phase 1 or 6.1 (as the case may be), of the nuclear weapons acquisition process.
(2) In the case of funds for activities described in subparagraph (B) or (D) of subsection (a)(2), a dedicated line item for each such activity for a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon that is in phase 3 or higher or phase 6.3 or higher (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapons acquisition process.
(c) Exception 
Subsection (a) shall not apply to funds for purposes of conducting, or providing for the conduct of, research and development, or manufacturing and engineering, determined by the Secretary to be necessary
(1) for the nuclear weapons life extension program;
(2) to modify an existing nuclear weapon solely to address safety or reliability concerns; or
(3) to address proliferation concerns.
(d) Definitions 
In this section:
(1) The term life extension program means the program to repair or replace non-nuclear components, or to modify the pit or canned subassembly, of nuclear weapons that are in the nuclear weapons stockpile on December 2, 2002, in order to assure that such nuclear weapons retain the ability to meet the military requirements applicable to such nuclear weapons when first placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) The term modified nuclear weapon means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which
(A) is in the nuclear weapons stockpile as of December 2, 2002; and
(B) is being modified in order to meet a military requirement that is other than the military requirements applicable to such nuclear weapon when first placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(3) The term new nuclear weapon means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which is neither
(A) in the nuclear weapons stockpile on December 2, 2002; nor
(B) in production as of that date.

50 USC 2530 - Limitation on underground nuclear weapons tests

No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted.

50 USC 2531 - Testing of nuclear weapons

(a) In general 
Of the funds authorized to be appropriated under section 3101(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103160) for the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1994 for weapons testing, $211,326,000 shall be available for infrastructure maintenance at the Nevada Test Site, and for maintaining the technical capability to resume underground nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site.
(b) Atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons 
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 or any other Act for any fiscal year may be available to maintain the capability of the United States to conduct atmospheric testing of a nuclear weapon.

50 USC 2532 - Manufacturing infrastructure for refabrication and certification of nuclear weapons stockpile

(a) Manufacturing program 

(1) The Secretary of Energy shall carry out a program for purposes of establishing within the Government a manufacturing infrastructure that has the capabilities of meeting the following objectives as specified in the Nuclear Posture Review:
(A) To provide a stockpile surveillance engineering base.
(B) To refabricate and certify weapon components and types in the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile, as necessary.
(C) To fabricate and certify new nuclear warheads, as necessary.
(D) To support nuclear weapons.
(E) To supply sufficient tritium in support of nuclear weapons to ensure an upload hedge in the event circumstances require.
(2) The purpose of the program carried out under paragraph (1) shall also be to develop manufacturing capabilities and capacities necessary to meet the requirements specified in the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Review.
(b) Required capabilities 
The manufacturing infrastructure established under the program under subsection (a) shall include the following capabilities (modernized to attain the objectives referred to in that subsection):
(1) The weapons assembly capabilities of the Pantex Plant.
(2) The weapon secondary fabrication capabilities of the Y12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
(3) The capabilities of the Savannah River Site relating to tritium recycling and fissile materials components processing and fabrication.
(4) The non-nuclear component capabilities of the Kansas City Plant.
(c) Nuclear Posture Review 
For purposes of subsection (a), the term Nuclear Posture Review means the Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review as contained in the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress dated February 19, 1995, or subsequent such reports.
(d) Funding 
Of the funds authorized to be appropriated under section 3101(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104106), $143,000,000 shall be available for carrying out the program required under this section, of which
(1) $35,000,000 shall be available for activities at the Pantex Plant;
(2) $30,000,000 shall be available for activities at the Y12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
(3) $35,000,000 shall be available for activities at the Savannah River Site; and
(4) $43,000,000 shall be available for activities at the Kansas City Plant.
(e) Plan and report 
The Secretary shall develop a plan for the implementation of this section. Not later than March 1, 1996, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the obligations the Secretary has incurred, and plans to incur, during fiscal year 1996 for the program referred to in subsection (a).

50 USC 2533 - Reports on critical difficulties at nuclear weapons laboratories and nuclear weapons production plants

(a) Reports by heads of laboratories and plants 
In the event of a difficulty at a nuclear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons production plant that has a significant bearing on confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon type, the head of the laboratory or plant, as the case may be, shall submit to the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs a report on the difficulty. The head of the laboratory or plant shall submit the report as soon as practicable after discovery of the difficulty.
(b) Transmittal by Assistant Secretary 
Not later than 10 days after receipt of a report under subsection (a), the Assistant Secretary shall transmit the report (together with the comments of the Assistant Secretary) to the congressional defense committees, to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense, and to the President.
(c) Omitted 
(d) Inclusion of reports in annual stockpile certification 
Any report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall also be included with the decision documents that accompany the annual certification of the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile which is provided to the President for the year in which such report is submitted.
(e) Definitions 
In this section:
(1) The term nuclear weapons laboratory means the following:
(A) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California.
(B) Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico.
(C) Sandia National Laboratories.
(2) The term nuclear weapons production plant means the following:
(A) The Pantex Plant, Texas.
(B) The Savannah River Site, South Carolina.
(C) The Kansas City Plant, Missouri.
(D) The Y12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

50 USC 2534 - Plan for transformation of National Nuclear Security Administration nuclear weapons complex

(a) Plan required 
The Secretary of Energy shall develop a plan to transform the nuclear weapons complex so as to achieve a responsive infrastructure by 2030. The plan shall be designed to accomplish the following objectives:
(1) To maintain the safety, reliability, and security of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile.
(2) To continue Stockpile Life Extension Programs that the Nuclear Weapons Council considers necessary.
(3) To prepare to produce replacement warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead program at a rate necessary to meet future stockpile requirements, commencing with a first production unit in 2012 and achieving steady-state production using modern manufacturing processes by 2025.
(4) To eliminate, within the nuclear weapons complex, duplication of production capability except to the extent required to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile.
(5) To maintain the current philosophy within the national security laboratories of peer review of nuclear weapons designs while eliminating duplication of laboratory capabilities except to the extent required to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile.
(6) To maintain the national security mission, and in particular the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, as the primary mission of the national security laboratories while optimizing the work-for-others activities of those laboratories to support other national security objectives in fields such as defense, intelligence, and homeland security.
(7) To consolidate to the maximum extent practicable, and to provide for the ultimate disposition of, special nuclear material throughout the nuclear weapons complex, with the ultimate goal of eliminating Category I and II special nuclear material from the national security laboratories no later than March 1, 2012, so as to further reduce the footprint of the nuclear weapons complex, reduce security costs, and reduce transportation costs for special nuclear material. This objective does not preclude the retention of Category I and II special nuclear materials at a national security laboratory if the transformation plan required by this subsection envisions a pit production capability (including interim pit production) at a national security laboratory.
(8) To employ a risk-based approach to ensure compliance with Design Basis Threat security requirements.
(9) To expeditiously dismantle inactive nuclear weapons to reduce the size of the stockpile to the lowest level required by the Nuclear Weapons Council.
(10) To operate the nuclear weapons complex in a more cost-effective manner.
(b) Report 
Not later than February 1, 2007, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the transformation plan required by subsection (a). The report shall address each of the objectives required by subsection (c)1 and also include each of the following:
(1) A comprehensive list of the capabilities, facilities, and project staffing that the National Nuclear Security Administration will need to have in place at the nuclear weapons complex as of 2030 to meet the requirements of the transformation plan.
(2) A comprehensive list of the capabilities and facilities that the National Nuclear Security Administration currently has in place at the nuclear weapons complex that will not be needed as of 2030 to meet the requirements of the transformation plan.
(3) A plan for implementing the transformation plan, including a schedule with incremental milestones.
(c) Consultation 
The Secretary of Energy shall develop the transformation plan required by subsection (a) in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council.
(d) Definition 
In this section, the term national security laboratory has the meaning given such term in section 2471 of this title.
[1] So in original. Probably should be subsection “(a)”.