Yolanda Painter filed this action against the defendants, alleges that her employer, Mazda Motor Manufacturing (USA) Corp., breached the terms of a collective bargaining agreement with the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America and UAW Local 3000, and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. Painter's Complaint also alleged that the defendants violated the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH.COMP.LAWS § 37.2101, et seq., in connection with her discharge from employment with Mazda. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. Painter now appeals the district court's judgment. We affirm.

Yolanda Painter is a white female and a single mother. She began working at Mazda on February 15, 1988, and she worked in the paint shop from that time until her termination in December 1990. Throughout the course of Painter's employment with Mazda, a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between her employer and the UAW governed the employment relationship. At the time of her new hire orientation, Painter learned that Mazda utilized a "team" concept, in which team members rotate among several interrelated assignments. Painter also learned that this concept required regular attendance at work, and that she would be required to report to work regularly and at her assigned starting time. Beginning early in her employment, however, Painter exhibited problems with attendance and tardiness.1

In October 1989, Mazda and the union negotiated a new "no fault" attendance system. Under this system, the company would not discharge an employee until the employee had received fifteen attendance "points" during any consecutive twelve-month period. The company assessed attendance points for any absence or tardiness regardless of whether the employee had a justifiable excuse for the absence, hence the term "no fault." The system entailed assigning one full point for a full day's absence or tardiness in excess of four hours; one half point for tardiness by four hours; and one third point for tardiness up to four hours. The attendance policy provided that the company would terminate any employee who received fifteen full points in a twelve-month term. Therefore, once twelve months from an employee's earliest absence or tardiness had elapsed, the attendance point would "drop off" the employee's attendance record and would not count against the employee. The policy did not assess points for the following types of absences: holidays; vacations; jury duty; military duty; union business; leaves of absence; bereavement; extreme hardship; company mandated time off; salary continuation (sick leave in excess of five days)/worker's compensation; or Acts of God. In addition, the company assessed points only against employees who failed to report at the beginning of their assigned starting time, but not against employees who left work before the end of their shift. Any employee who believed that the company had improperly assessed an attendance point could grieve the point assessment through procedures established by the collective bargaining agreement.

Painter supported the adoption of the no-fault policy, and she voted in favor of the attendance system when the union presented the policy to its membership for a vote. She admitted in her deposition that she understood that the policy established a "flat out across the board no-fault attendance policy." Plaintiff's Depo. at 95. Once the company adopted this attendance system, Painter took two "salary continuation" periods exempt from the attendance point assessments, from December 20, 1990 through January 5, 1990 and from February 5, 1990 through March 26, 1990. On April 23, within six months of the policy's adoption, Painter received a written discipline for having accumulated seven and two-thirds attendance points as of that date. Painter met with her supervisor, Lisa Ducharme, in connection with this discipline, and Ducharme advised Painter that her attendance was "a problem." By July 31, Painter had accumulated nine attendance points, and she received another written discipline from Ducharme. Painter discussed this discipline with her union, but she did not file a grievance because the warning was in accord with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

On September 23, after accumulating additional attendance points, Painter did not report for work. As a result, she received a "last chance" corrective action notice warning her that her next absence would result in her termination from Mazda. Between September 23 and October 24, the date of Painter's next absence, the twelve-month "drop off" aspect of the attendance policy erased a previous absence. Therefore, Mazda did not terminate Painter for her absence on October 24, but Painter did receive another final warning.2 On November 14, Painter failed to report to work. As a result, she received another last chance corrective action notice advising her that she had accumulated fourteen and two-thirds absences, and that her next absence or tardy would result in her termination from Mazda. Painter did not file a grievance about this notice because it complied with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

On December 3, Painter reported late for work. Painter alleges that she was unable to report on time for work that morning because of a three and one-half inch snowfall which occurred in Detroit that morning. Mazda, however, was open for business on that date. In fact, the vast majority of employees reported to work on time that morning. Moreover, every other employee late for work that day received attendance points for tardiness. As a result of Painter's tardiness, she received one-third of a point, which put her twelve-month total at fifteen attendance points. Consistent with the attendance policy, Mazda terminated Painter's employment.

Painter met with her union representative to discuss her termination. The union filed a grievance on her behalf and processed that grievance through the initial steps established under the collective bargaining agreement. After these steps, the union was unsuccessful in achieving Painter's reinstatement. At that point, the union determined that Painter's grievance lacked merit in light of her poor attendance record during the course of her employment with Mazda. Consequently, the union decided not to submit Painter's grievance to arbitration.

On June 28, 1991, Painter filed this action against Mazda, the Union, UAW Local 3000, and Greg Drudi, her union representative. In a hybrid section 301 claim under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, Painter alleges that Mazda breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement by failing to excuse her absence on December 3 as an Act of God or for an extenuating circumstance, and that the union breached its duty of fair representation in failing to submit her grievance to arbitration. Painter also alleges that the defendants violated Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH.COMP.LAWS § 37.2101, et seq., in connection with her discharge from employment. The defendants moved for summary judgment on each of Painter's claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Painter had failed to present evidence that Mazda had breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement or that the union breached its duty of fair representation. The court also found no evidence to support a prima facie case of discrimination or to support Painter's assertion that Mazda's justification for discharging her was pretextual. Painter argues that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment to the defendants. We disagree.

Under FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c), the district court must grant summary judgment "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Brooks v. Amer. Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.1991). Moreover, we must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

A hybrid section 301 action involves two constituent claims: breach of a collective bargaining agreement by the employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. See DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 162 (1983). "[T]he two claims are inextricably interdependent." Id. As such, "to recover against either the Company or the Union, [the plaintiff] must show that the Company breached the [Collective Bargaining] Agreement and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation." Bagsby v. Lewis Bros., Inc. of Tennessee, 820 F.2d 799, 801 (6th Cir.1987) (emphasis in original). See also Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 930 F.2d 505, 510 (6th Cir.1991); White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir.1990). Therefore, if Painter is unable to present evidence that Mazda violated the collective bargaining agreement or that the union breached its duty of fair representation, her claims against Mazda and the union must fail.

Painter has failed to put forth any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether Mazda breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Painter argues that Mazda should not have assessed an attendance point against her for her absence on December 3, 1990 because an Act of God--a three and one-half inch snowfall--prevented her from reporting to work on time. Painter has put forth no evidence that the collective bargaining agreement required Mazda to declare an Act of God after a mere three and one-half inch snowfall in Detroit. In fact, evidence in the record indicates that Mazda would declare an Act of God only if the natural phenomenon resulted in closure of the plant, and that the decision to close the plant due to an Act of God rested firmly within the discretion of the management. Mazda did not close the facility as a result of the snowfall; therefore, the company did not breach the collective bargaining agreement by failing to excuse Painter's absence due to an Act of God. Nor do we find evidence to support Painter's argument that Mazda should have excused her absence as a result of extenuating circumstances. The collective bargaining agreement's no-fault attendance policy provides that an employee asserting that extenuating circumstances led to the accumulation of fifteen attendance points may appeal those points through a grievance procedure. No evidence supports Painter's argument that Mazda should have excused her final absence as the result of extenuating circumstances. Therefore, Painter has failed to meet her burden to present evidence that Mazda breached the collective bargaining agreement in connection with Painter's discharge from employment.

Moreover, Painter has produced no evidence to support her assertion that the union breached its duty of fair representation. "A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining agreement is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 189 (1968). As the Supreme Court recently explained in Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill, 113 L.Ed.2d 51, 65 (1991), a union breaches its duty of fair representation only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a "wide range of reasonableness" as to be irrational or arbitrary. Merely characterizing a union's actions in conclusory terms is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Rather, to meet the burden of proof as to the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, a plaintiff must establish by substantial evidence that the union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or with bad faith. See Ratkosky v. United Transp. Union, 843 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.1988). Painter has utterly failed to present any evidence that the union acted in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner or in bad faith when it determined that her grievance did not warrant arbitration. Because Painter failed to meet her burden of showing either that Mazda breached the collective bargaining agreement or that the union breached its duty of fair representation, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants.

The district court also correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants on Painter's claim under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH.COMP.LAWS § 37.2101, et seq. Painter argues that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of sex, marital status, age, and race3 in connection with her discharge from employment. To prevail on a claim for discrimination under Michigan's Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrimination by showing either that she was accorded disparate treatment because of the asserted characteristic or by showing that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination. Dixon v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 168 Mich.App. 107, 114, 423 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1987). If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. Id. Once the defendant rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, "even if it is in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must put forth factual allegations to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered reasons were mere pretext." Clark v. Uniroyal Corp., 119 Mich.App. 820, 825-26, 327 N.W.2d 372, 374-75 (1982). Assuming without deciding that Painter has presented a prima facie case of discrimination, she has not put forth any evidence that Mazda's reason for her discharge was pretextual.4 Thus, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Painter's discrimination claims.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.