MEMORANDUM**

Treva Vandenbosch, Frank Murray, Craig Ogram, Leroy Pearl, and Ron Atkinson ("Appellants") appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment against them on their fraudulent concealment and willful assault tort claims against Georgia Pacific Corporation ("Georgia"). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1294. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the willful assault claim, but reverse as to the fraudulent concealment claim.

Georgia operates a lumber mill. In an area of the mill called the Quadmill, Georgia operates a piece of machinery known as the "hog." On Saturday, February 11, 1989, a seam in the electrical capacitor attached to the hog broke and dumped four to seven gallons of oil containing PCB's upon Appellant Murray and onto the area surrounding the hog. (CR 59: District Court ("DC") Order at 2).

It is undisputed that at the time of the spill, the capacitor displayed a warning label stating that the capacitor contained PCB's. (CR 59: DC Order at 2). Additionally, it is undisputed that old Georgia records show that the hog capacitor contained PCB's at some time in the past, and that the records do not specifically show that the hog capacitor was replaced by another capacitor that did not contain PCB's. (CR 59: DC Order at 3). Finally, it is undisputed that at the time of the spill Appellants and other Georgia employees informed management that they believed the spilled oil contained PCB's. (CR 59: DC Order at 3).

Georgia ordered Appellants to continue working in the area of the spill despite Appellants' complaints that exposure to the spilled oil was making them sick and causing them anxiety. (CR 38: Murray Decl. at 2, 3, 5, 6; Vandenbosch Decl. at 2, 3; CR 59: DC Order at 4). On February 13, 1991, after ordering Appellants to work in the contaminated area for two days, Georgia sent a sample of the oil for PCB testing. (CR 59: DC Order at 3). The lab test revealed that the oil contained PCB's. (CR 59: DC Order at 3). Nevertheless, Georgia management ordered Appellants to continue working in the contaminated area. (CR 38: Murray Decl. at 6-7; Vandenbosch Decl. at 6).

Appellants claim that Georgia knew that they were injured by their exposure to the spilled oil, but concealed this knowledge from them and thereby aggravated their injuries. Appellants also claim that Georgia specifically intended to injure them by exposing them to the spilled oil. The district court granted Georgia's motion for summary of judgment on both of Appellants' claims. They appeal.

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir.1992). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those evidentiary materials that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 541-42 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

The nonmoving party need not present sufficient evidence to allow the court to decide the issue of material fact in its favor. T.W. Elec. Services, Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987). Rather, the nonmoving party need only present enough evidentiary materials to establish the existence of a factual dispute requiring a jury to resolve the parties' differing versions of the facts. Id.

Appellants contend that the district court erroneously granted Georgia's motion for summary judgment on the fraudulent concealment claim. To establish a fraudulent concealment claim, Appellants must prove that Georgia had actual knowledge that spilled PCB's caused their work-related injuries but concealed such knowledge and thereby aggravated their injuries. Foster v. Xerox Corp., 40 Cal.3d 306, 311-12 (1985). The district court found that Appellants presented insufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Georgia had actual knowledge of any injuries resulting from exposure to the oil spill.

It is undisputed that at the time of the oil spill, a warning label was prominently displayed on the hog capacitor. The label stated that the capacitor contained PCB's. Additionally, it is undisputed that old Georgia records show that the hog capacitor contained PCB's at some point. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the records do not specifically show that the hog capacitor was replaced by another capacitor that did not contain PCB's.

In addition, Appellants presented evidence that Appellants informed Georgia management that their exposure to the spilled oil made them physically sick, and that their continued exposure to the spilled oil was causing them additional physical and psychological injury.1 Appellants further presented evidence that Georgia management continued to order employees to work in the contaminated area after discovering that the spilled oil contained PCB's.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Appellants, the district court erroneously held that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Georgia had actual knowledge of Appellants' injuries caused by the oil spill.2 Appellants presented enough evidentiary materials to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Georgia had actual knowledge that they each suffered an injury because of their exposure to the spilled oil.

Appellants also contend that the district court erroneously granted Georgia's motion for summary judgment on the willful assault claim. To establish a claim for willful assault, Appellants must show that Georgia specifically intended to injure them by exposing them to the spilled oil. See Stalnaker v. Boeing Co., 186 Cal.App.3d 1291, 1301 (1986) (evidence that an employer knowingly exposed an employee to a workplace hazard will not establish a willful assault claim).

Appellants failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Georgia specifically intended to injure them by exposing them to the spilled oil.

REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.