UNITED STATES V. ROUSSOPULOUS.

911

Looking at the whole of paragraph 585, and giving to it a construction in accordance with what seems to have been the intention of congress, the term "scientific instruments" means instruments specially designed for use in any particular science, and which are principally employed for such purpose; and, surgery being a science, it covers the surgical instruments in question in this case, which were imported for the use of the Massachusetts General Hospital in its clinics and training school. The fact that such instruments are employed by surgeons in the practice of their profession does not make them mechanical instruments. Instruments of this kind, in our opinion, are scientific instruments, within the meaning of the statute, until it is shown that their principal use is in the trades and arts. For example, an ordinary knife is a mechanical instrument, because its principal use is in the trades and arts, while a surgeon's knife, specially designed for use in surgery, and principally used for such purpose, is a scientific instrument. As applied to scientific instruments, this construction does not seem in any way to conflict with the views expressed by the supreme court in Robertson v. Oelschlaeger, and the doctrine of principal use recognized in that case. The question is raised that the petitioner is not an institution "incorporated or established" for any of the purposes mentioned in paragraph 585. Upon this point the evidence shows that one of the purposes for which the hospital was established was educational, although that may not have been the principal design. The decision of the board of general appraisers is reversed.

UNITED STATES v. ROUSSOPULOUS.

(DIstrict Court, D. Minnesota. Third Division. April 24, 1899.)
CoUNTERFEITING-ToKENS INTENDED TO CIRCULATE AS MONEY.

Circular metal tokens, which, though of similar color, differ In size, and wholly In design from any coin of the United States, and are only from one-sixth to one-fifth the weight of the coin the nearest the same size, and which do not purport to be money, or obllgatlons to pay money, but contain the names of business concerns, with the statement that they are good for a certain value in merchandise, are not tokens In the likeness and simllltude of coins of the United States, nor intended to circulate as money, and to be received and used in lieu of lawful money, within the prohibi· tion of Rev. St. §§ 3583, 5462, or of the act of February 10, 1891.

On Demurrer to Information. Milton D. Purdy, Asst. U; S. Atty. J. M. Hawthorne, for defendant. LOCHREN, District Judge. The defendant (lemurs generally to the information in this case, the first four counts of which charge that the defendant, at the time and place state!I, did make and issue tokens and obligations of metal, each for a sum less than one dollar, intended to cirCUlate as money, and to be received and used in lieu of lawful money of the United States. Two additional counts charge that the defendant, at the same time and place, did make
95F.-62

978
!!,' ". :' '.; , r'

95 FEDER.Ai nEPORTER.

"',: ; :::' : " 'Be made, " ,";: " ,._ ; " " ,:

and hftvein his possession,. intent to business t?kens metal, in golor, thereon, of com u(oJie mstan,ce' and 'gold cmil'ill' the other, of the Umted States, of specified ,deuominatioJ1s. Each 'count in the information'contains the: of an impression of each of the sides of the metal in thl./-t ,count. It thus apve!lrs upon the face of the information that. the, 'metal token described in the first count is circular ,in form, a little smaller than the half-dollar silver coin of the United States, and6J'l one side bears the raised inscrip- , tioil, "Clark & Boice Lumber 00.1898. Jefferson Texas," and on the other side, ."Good for SOc in Its weight is algrains troy weight,which is' less than one-fifth the weight of the ,half-dollar coin, which is the nearest to it in size of any coin. of ,the United States. It differs in its devices and inscriptions, plainly from aU Cdills of the United States, ana is not liable to. be mistaken for any of them, even bycl1relessor illiterate persons. It do"es not purport to be a piece of money; or obligation to pay, money, and the obligation expresf3ed is in. tewf3 solvable in merchandise. It cMnot, therefore? have been intended to circulate al'l uioney, or to be received arid used in lieu of laWful money, and noteollle, within the prohibition of section U. So U. S. v. Van Auken, 96 U. S. 366. The"same reasons lead to the like conqlllsion in respect to, the, tokens described in the' other counts of the illforihatioIi. ''Neither do any of these tokens come within the provisions of section Rev. St. U. s., which also applies only to tokens intended to be used as money. The fifth count describes a metal token,: circul:;tli in form, and a trifle, larger than the side bears half-dollar lilNVel;' coin of the "(Jnited States, which on the raised i'nscription, "A. M. Adler, Wagon Mound, 'New Mex.," and on the other side,"Good,for $1.00 in Its weight, is alieged'to be 47 troy weight. This does not supportthe avermenfthat it is in the likeriess andsitnilitlide of the silver coin of the;,Uilit'ed, States dollar, which larger than this token, and 'more than, six times as heavy;, 'and with no similarity; fn, 'device':'Or 'inscription,', It. ·does not, come within ., of the act .()f February .W". " An.d like reasons a.pplY,to the metal in, the sixth count of the information. The demurrer is therefore sustained, and judgment will be entered discharging the defendant. . T)

"

v

v. DISTILLING & ,(Circuit Court, Ill; D. Ohio, W. D.July 31, ,1899,)
,.

I

CO.

No. 5,238. " ,

1.

All ,allegation that defendant is a corporation "organized under and pursuant fo ,the laws of the state Of New Jersey" is an afilrmative statement that defendant is a citizen of New Jersey.

OF FEDERAL COURT..., CI'l'IZENSHlP. OF CORPORATION- SUFFI. CIENCY,Of ALLEGArroN. .'. '..,'