MEMORANDUM**

Ernest Bouvier-Moore, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment in favor of Trans World Airlines, Inc. ("TWA") in his breach of contract diversity action in which Moore alleged that TWA had lost his luggage, failed to credit his TWA Frequent Flier Bonus account ("FFB"), and improperly debited his FFB account. Moore also contends that the district court erred by denying him access to another prisoner who Moore claims is a material witness in this action and by denying his request for further discovery. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and affirm.

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3217 (1990). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility for informing the district court of the basis for its motion...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'--that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.

If the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial with respect to a material fact, the party opposing the motion is required "to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "To show existence of a 'genuine' issue, appellant[ ] must present some evidence establishing each element of [his] claims on which [he] would bear the burden of proof at trial. [He] must produce at least some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint." Smolen v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir.1990) (quotations and citations omitted).

Moore's complaint alleges three separate causes of action. First, Moore contends that TWA lost one of his bags on a Rome to San Francisco flight and failed to adequately compensate him. TWA, however, sent Moore a check for $400.00 to the address listed by Moore on his lost luggage claim form. The amount of the payment complied with the Warsaw Convention, which governs claims for lost luggage on international flights. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1502. The reimbursement amount also complied with TWA's own baggage loss limits. In Deiro v. American Airlines, Inc., we held that a passenger was bound by an airline's baggage loss limits if the passenger was a regular flyer and was given a fair opportunity to purchase additional insurance. 816 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir.1987). At the time Moore's luggage was lost, he was a regular flyer and had been given a fair opportunity to purchase additional coverage. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to TWA on this first cause of action. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

Moore's also contends that his endorsement on the check was forged. Moore, however, offered no significant probative evidence to support a claim against TWA based on this alleged forgery other than his bald assertion. Compare id. at 325. Moore does not contend that the check was not properly mailed to the address he had listed on his lost baggage claim form or that he had previously notified TWA of any change in his address. Instead, he contends that the check was forged by a third party after being received at his address. Given that the check was sent to his address and was endorsed with a signature bearing his name that is similar to Moore's own signature, the district court correctly determined that Moore had not meet his burden to withstand summary judgment in favor of TWA on this issue. See id.

Moore's second cause of action alleged that TWA had failed to credit his FFB account for a Tokyo flight. TWA's FFB program, however, contains provisions which allows TWA to (1) terminate benefits under the FFB program without prior notice and (2) disqualify participants in the FFB program "if in TWA's sole judgment" the participant violated any of the rules of the program. Here, TWA found that Moore violated the FFB rules by using a fraudulent credit card to purchase airline tickets.1 Given the contractual nature of the FFB program and TWA's reservation of the right to disqualify participants in its sole judgment and to terminate benefits under the program without prior notice, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this second cause of action. See Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exch., 913 F.2d 676, 687-88 (9th Cir.1990) (FFB program rights are contractual rights, not property rights).

Moore's third cause of action alleges that two FFB flight certificates mailed to Moore's address were not requested by Moore and thus were issued improperly by TWA. Under the terms of the FFB program, TWA issues certificates, which can be redeemed for airline tickets, either upon written or telephoned request. These certificates may be issued in the name of qualified third parties. For security reasons, TWA mails the certificates to the participant's address, even if the awards are to be used by a third party. Here, Moore offered no evidence that this procedure was not followed. He contends only that he did not request the certificates. Even assuming that is true, under the terms of the FFB program, TWA is not responsible for certificates which are lost, stolen, or destroyed and will not replace such certificates. Given this provision, the district court properly granted summary judgment to TWA. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

Finally, Moore contends that the district court erred by denying him access to another prisoner, Bobby Hutchinson, who Moore claimed was a material witness in this action, and by denying his request for further discovery. Moore previously raised the issue of correspondence with Hutchinson in a petition for mandamus which we denied. Bouvier-Moore v. United States District Court For the S. Dist. of Cal., No. 88-8241 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1084 (1989). Thus, Moore is precluded from reasserting this issue on appeal. In addition, Moore has failed to make any showing of factual detail which he would expect to obtain either through correspondence with Hutchinson or by further discovery. Given that substantial discovery had taken place and that the case had been pending for over one and one-half years when motion for summary judgment was not granted, the district court did not err in limiting further discovery.

AFFIRMED.