MEMORANDUM**

Michele Veronica X appeals her conviction of juvenile delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032. Specifically, she was charged with and found guilty of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343. The government concedes on appeal that defendant was not liable as a principal but asserts that she was liable as an aider and abettor. Aiding and abetting is implied in every federal indictment for a substantive offense, United States v. Armstrong, 909 F.2d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 191 (1990), and so the government is free to urge affirmance on that theory.

Defendant's argument on appeal is not that a scheme of wire fraud did not exist but rather that defendant did not know of the scheme and did not intend to participate in it. We have stated that "[c]onviction as an aider and abettor requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willingly associated himself with a criminal venture and participated therein as something he wished to bring about." United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846, 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 561 (1989). Defendant testified that she believed Michael Conroy's story that people around the country were wiring him money they owed him and that the money was sent in defendant's name because Conroy did not have identification. Defendant also testified that her mother encouraged her to help Conroy because her mother was too busy to do it. Despite this testimony, the district court found that all the elements of the offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Our standard of review on appeal is highly deferential. We must affirm the conviction if "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). We hold that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aiding and abetting wire fraud, including intent, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant argues that there was no direct evidence of intent to commit this offense. However, "[a]n abettor's criminal intent may be inferred from the attendant facts and circumstances and need not be established by direct evidence." United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d at 850. Defendant apparently did not know Conroy well or know what he did for a living. She went with him on at least seven separate occasions to receive money that had been sent in her name from different locations around the country. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time and was receiving above average grades in school, but testified that she was not inquisitive about the source of the money. Although defendant testified that she learned the money had been sent in her name on the way to receive the first money order, the district court noted that it was unlikely that Conroy would have the money sent in defendant's name unless he was certain that she would receive the money order for him. A rational trier of fact could have found on the basis of these facts that the defendant had willfully blinded herself to the existence of the mail fraud scheme. A rational trier of fact could also have disbelieved defendant's testimony that her mother encouraged her to help Conroy because the mother was too busy, since testimony showed that the mother herself had been present on several occasions when the money was received.

Because a rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's conviction is

AFFIRMED.