936 F2d 579 Thirteen South Ltd v. Summit Village Inc

936 F.2d 579

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

THIRTEEN SOUTH LTD., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUMMIT VILLAGE, INC., Roy Darrow, Statewide Trust Deed
Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90-56114.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 3, 1991.*
Decided June 26, 1991.

Before GOODWIN, PREGERSON and ALARCON, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM**

2

Thirteen South Ltd. appeals an August 1990 district court order dismissing its action against Summit Village, Inc., Roy Darrow, and Statewide Trust Deed Services, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Summit Village"). Thirteen South presents two arguments. First, it contends that the court erred in ruling that the claimed amount in controversy was less than the jurisdictional minimum needed to sustain diversity jurisdiction. Second, it contends that the court erred in ruling that it lacked federal question jurisdiction because Summit Village was not acting under color of state law. We reject both arguments and affirm.

3

Thirteen South's case arises out of its purchase of Lot 471 in the Summit Village Subdivision, Douglas County, Nevada. Summit Village is a non-profit Nevada corporation which administers the Summit Village Homeowner's Association. The Association's by-laws and covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC & R's") provide for dues and special assessments, and they authorize judicial and extra-judicial procedures for their collection. Summit Village claimed a lien for dues and assessments, which amounted to $639.80 in March 1990. The amount, including foreclosure costs, increased to $1,192.34 by May 1990.

4

Thirteen South alleged claims for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, interference with prospective advantage, and violation of civil rights. The court, sua sponte, entered an order requiring Thirteen South to show cause why its action should not be dismissed. After Thirteen South filed its response, the district court dismissed the action.

5

Thirteen South's first argument is that the court erred in holding that the claimed amount in controversy was less than the $50,000 necessary to sustain diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(a) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs...."). In Paragraph 26 of its first amended complaint, Thirteen South states that the current value of its property is $35,000, and without the allegedly improper restrictions, Thirteen South claims the property would be worth $70,000. Thus, assuming arguendo that Thirteen South's estimates are correct, the claimed amount in controversy is only $35,000--the value of the land without the alleged restrictions minus the current actual value--and therefore less than the jurisdictional minimum.

6

In Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, this court observed that "[t]he amount in controversy is normally determined from the face of the pleadings." Id., 802 F.2d 362, 363 (9th Cir.1986). Because Thirteen South's pleadings show "to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount," St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938), the district court properly found that it lacked diversity jurisdiction.

7

Thirteen South's second argument is that the court erred in holding that it lacked federal question jurisdiction because Summit Village was not acting under color of state law. More accurately, there was failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Summit Village assessed Thirteen South an amount reflecting unpaid dues and assessments, and when Thirteen South failed to pay these sums, Summit Village recorded a lien against Lot 471 and resorted to statutorily permitted extra-judicial measures to foreclose and obtain payment. Resort to these statutorily permitted measures prompted Thirteen South's complaint, and Thirteen South contends that use of these measures constitutes an act under color of state law.

8

In support of its allegation that Summit Village is acting under color of state law and that the court therefore had federal question jurisdiction, Thirteen South points to the statutory requirement that documents affecting title to land must be recorded and the fact that Summit Village recorded the CC & R's and notices of lien which give rise to the case before us. The court ruled that Summit Village's recourse to a state statute to enforce private rights failed to implicate the state sufficiently to support a finding of state action.

9

A party bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 must show that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law. "The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation[, however,] does not by itself convert its action into that of the State...." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). A state generally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or provided such significant encouragement that the choice must in law be deemed that of the state. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Thirteen South has not shown that Summit Village was acting under color of state law.

10

AFFIRMED.

*

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for submission on the record and briefs and without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3