MEMORANDUM**

Steven Samuel Solomon (Solomon), defendant, appeals pro se the District Court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 motion to vacate or correct his sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel. This court reviews de novo a District Court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 motion to vacate. United States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 713 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 16 (1986).

In mid June 1987, Ted Golden (Golden), a DEA undercover agent, agreed to purchase ten (10) kilograms of cocaine from Victor Owens (Owens). On the morning of June 22, Owens and Golden agreed to complete a six (6) kilogram cocaine transaction. They met at the Marina Green in San Francisco that afternoon, and Golden showed Owens the money for the purchase. After seeing the money, Owens went to get the cocaine in San Rafael and indicated that he would return with it to the Marina Green. Owens, who was under aerial surveillance went straight from the Marina Green to Solomon's residence at 290 Seaview Drive in San Rafael.

Owens left 290 Seaview Drive and called Golden to meet him at the Marina Green. When they met, Owens directed Golden to a grocery bag on the floor of his car; the bag contained six kilograms of cocaine as well as a Long's Drug Store receipt dated June 22, 1987.

Owens was arrested and DEA agents went to secure the residence at 290 Seaview Drive. Solomon lived at 290 Seaview Drive with his wife and small child. No one else resided there or was present when the agents secured the residence. Pursuant to a search warrant, a search was made of 290 Seaview Drive, and agents lawfully seized $96,940 in U.S. currency from Solomon's briefcase; a triple beam scale that had Solomon's fingerprint and cocaine residue on it; and two knives with cocaine residue on them.

Owens pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreed to testify pursuant to a plea agreement. Owens testified that he got the cocaine from Solomon inside his residence at 290 Seaview Drive. In addition, he also testified that Solomon transferred the cocaine from a blue sports bag to a paper grocery bag.

Solomon was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, a five year special parole term, and five years probation on March 4, 1988, following a jury verdict of guilty on two cocaine related offenses.

Solomon contends that his legal counsel, Michael Stepanian, offered him inadequate representation. Specifically, the alleged deficient performance concerns Stepanian's failure to investigate from which Long's Drug Store the receipt found in the shopping bag containing cocaine originated. In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel Solomon must show: (a) that Stepanian's performance was outside of the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; and (b) that such deficient performance prejudiced Solomon, in that there is a reasonable probability--a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome--that but for Stepanian's errors Solomon would not have been convicted. See United States v. Burrows, 872 F.2d 915, 917-919 (9th Cir.1989).

The receipt had no unique code to identify it to a certain store. Solomon claims that all five Long's in Marin County, where he lived, issued receipts containing store numbers, and three stores in Alameda County, where Owens lived, issued receipts that did not contain store numbers.

Solomon argues that by showing that the shopping bag came from an Alameda Long's Drug Store, it would: a) cause the jury to infer that Solomon's co-defendant, Alameda county resident Victor Owens, was at all relevant times in sole possession of the shopping bag containing the cocaine; and b) weaken the credibility for Drug Enforcement Administration agent Ted Golden, who testified that the store issuing the sales receipt could not be determined from the receipt itself.

However, Solomon ignores the other evidence produced against him. Besides Owen's testimony, there was physical evidence lawfully seized from his residence. The articles seized included $96,940 from Solomon's briefcase, a triple beam scale containing his fingerprints and cocaine residue, and two knives with cocaine residue on them. The discovery of drug paraphernalia and large sums of unexplained cash are relevant to prove involvement in a drug transaction. United States v. Bernal, 719 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir.1983). Solomon has not shown that the receipt has particular significance likely to alter the outcome of the case. Thus, Stepanian's failure to investigate which store issued the sale receipt simply did not constitute performance that was outside of the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

Solomon also contends that the District Court should have held evidentiary hearings on his Sec. 2255 motion. An evidentiary hearing is usually required if the motion states a claim based on matters outside the record or events outside the courtroom. Watts v. United States, 841 F.2d 275, 277 (9th Cir.1988). However, the District Court does not have to hold an evidentiary hearing if "the motions and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, United States v. Espinoza, 866 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.1988). Here, there is enough evidence in the records and files to conclusively show that Solomon is not entitled to any relief under his Sec. 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Thus, the District Court did not err by not holding an evidentiary hearing on Solomon's motion.

Solomon next contends that the District Court abused its discretion in not appointing counsel to assist him in bring the Sec. 2255 motion. The District Court has wide discretion in deciding whether to appoint counsel for habeas corpus petitioners. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.1987); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(g). The court should determine whether or not to appoint counsel in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved, and the likelihood of success on the merits. Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir.1983). However, when a petitioner in a habeas corpus proceedings has a good understanding of the issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his contentions then no attorney is legally required. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.1987). Based on the clear and concise presentation of the arguments in Solomon's Sec. 2255 motion, it is clear that he had a good understanding of the issues and the ability to present them coherently. Thus, the District Court judge did not abuse his discretion by forgoing Solomon's claim to an attorney.

Solomon also attempts to raise a Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) issue on appeal. However, because Solomon failed to raise this issue in District Court, it is deemed waived. See International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.1985). The court will review the issue not raised below only in exceptional circumstances, including need to prevent manifest injustice. Id. at 1404.

AFFIRMED.