MEMORANDUM**

Leonard Bourque appeals his sentence following a guilty plea to unarmed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a). Bourque contends that the district court erred by sentencing him as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.1 because the record in two of his prior convictions was silent as to his awareness and waiver of the right to a jury trial and the government failed to produce any extrinsic evidence that Bourque's waiver was intelligent and voluntary.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and we affirm.

We review de novo whether a prior conviction is covered under the Guidelines, "while factual matters concerning the prior conviction are reviewed for clear error." United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir.1990). The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any fact that the sentencing court would use to increase the defendant's criminal history score. Id., 912 F.2d at 1122. Proof of the fact of conviction satisfies the government's initial burden for inclusion of a prior conviction in a criminal history score calculation. Id. The defendant then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior conviction was constitutionally invalid. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2, comment. n. 6.

For a guilty plea to be valid, a defendant must enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1968). We cannot presume a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to trial by a jury from a silent record. Id., 395 U.S. at 243. However, Boykin does not require specific articulation of the right to trial by a jury so long as the record affirmatively shows that a defendant entered his guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently. Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir.1974); see also Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1057 (1987); United States v. Freed, 703 F.2d 394, 395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839 (1983).

Bourque contends that because the Massachusetts sentencing judge referred only to Bourque's waiver of the right to "trial," not "jury trial," during the change of plea colloquy, the record fails to establish that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights as required by Boykin.2 Nevertheless, the transcript of Bourque's change of plea hearing in the Massachusetts convictions includes eight pages of questioning by the sentencing judge regarding the reasons for Bourque's change of plea, his state of mind, and the rights that he waived as a result of that plea. That transcript reveals Bourque (1) had received some college level education in a federal penitentiary, (2) had no mental conditions which could interfere with his understanding of the consequences of his plea, (3) was not under the influence of any mind altering substance, and (4) admitted his guilt in the offenses. Therefore, the record in the prior convictions is not silent as to whether Bourque entered his guilty plea voluntarily and knowingly. In addition, the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court regarding the validity of the prior convictions showed that Bourque had four convictions prior to the entry of his guilty plea in the Massachusetts convictions. Thus, Bourque was a well-educated individual with extensive experience in the criminal justice system at the time that he entered his guilty plea to the disputed convictions.

Given this background, Bourque failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the fact that the Massachusetts sentencing court referred to waiver of the right to "trial" rather than "jury trial" when Bourque entered his guilty pleas rendered those pleas unknowing and involuntary. See Newman, 912 F.2d at 1124; Freed, 703 F.2d at 395; Wilkins, 505 F.2d at 765.

AFFIRMED.