MEMORANDUM**

Pro se appellant Rita Ellen Kane challenges the district court's dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim against various employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). Kane contends the defendants violated her Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when Kane visited her husband, who is incarcerated. The district court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.

Kane asserts she was subject to cruel and unusual punishment when the defendants: (1) ordered her to change her clothing; (2) strip-searched her husband where Kane and others could see him; (3) conducted clothed body searches of her husband in full view of others; (4) yelled abusive language towards her husband in Kane's presence; and (5) deprived Kane of nutritional food and drink during her visit to the prison. Kane's complaint fails to state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court has held the Eighth Amendment applies only to those convicted of crimes. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). In Ingraham, the Court rejected an Eighth Amendment claim made by school children. In doing so, the Court stated, "[i]n the few cases where the Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable." Id. at 667-68. Therefore, it is clear that Kane does not have a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

Kane contends her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when defendants detained her against her will for fifteen minutes and temporarily seized a four-page AIMS computer read-out. Prison administrators have broad discretion to implement policies and practices designed to ensure the safety of the inmates and staff within a facility. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). Central to all other goals is internal security within the prison. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974). Therefore, when prison security is at stake, "prison officials must be accorded latitude." Id. at 826 (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972)).

The detention was not custodial, involuntary detention. She entered the jail facility voluntarily as a visitor and the detention was merely to comply with reasonable visitor regulations. A fifteen minute detention in order to ensure Kane had complied with the regulations was not unreasonable. The defendants' actions are made even more reasonable by the fact that they found what appeared to be "contraband" in Kane's possession. Under Arizona law, a prisoner may not have access to any records of prison care and custody. See A.R.S. Sec. 31-221(D). Although Kane received her husband's records upon request from the ADOC, the defendants were correct in temporarily seizing the document until they could determine whether it was proper for Kane or her husband to possess this information.

Prison officials may ban contact visits in prison facilities altogether. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984). "Contact visits invite a host of security problems." Id. at 586. Here, the prison is not disallowing contact visits but is simply taking the precautions necessary to ensure security. The defendants' actions were not unwarranted. Therefore, the district court's dismissal was proper.

AFFIRMED.