MEMORANDUM**

Appellant Lawrence Long appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment and the granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment in Long's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action against the county clerk of the Superior Court of Washington. At the time Long filed his pro se civil rights action he was an inmate at the Clallam Bay State Prison.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the nonmoving part is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1235 (9th Cir.1984). We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the manner most favorable to the nonmoving party. Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1235. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

* The uncontroverted facts as established from the record are as follows. The plaintiff mailed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion and affidavit of application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to the Clallam County Superior Court Clerk's Office. Pursuant to Clallam County Superior Court policy, those documents were presented to Clallam County Superior Court Judge Gary Velie by Deputy Clerk Mollie Lingvall. After reviewing the documents, Judge Velie determined the plaintiff was pursuing the wrong approach to seek relief from his state court conviction and needed instead to file a personal restraint petition. Therefore, Judge Velie directed Ms. Lingvall to return the documents to the plaintiff, without the judge having acted upon them. Long then filed this Section 1983 action alleging that he had been denied lawful access to the courts of Washington State. Long named Emily Russo, Clerk of the Superior Court for Clallam County, "in her individual and/or official capacity," as the defendant in this case. Ms. Russo did not participate in handling any of Long's documents.

Subsequent to filing his action, Long was offered the opportunity to resubmit his petition for habeas corpus with the judge, who would file it if Long's indigency was established, although the judge believed this to be a futile attempt to gain relief. (See Affidavit of Judge Velie attached to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p 6.)

A review of the record reveals no genuine issues of material fact and that the district court, adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation, correctly applied relevant substantive law. Long failed to state facts which supported his claim of deprivation of his constitutional rights. Long was also offered the opportunity to resubmit his petition, but declined to do so. Long also had an alternative forum in the Washington appellate courts. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 n. 16 (5th Cir.1979).

Furthermore, neither the named defendant, Emily Russo, or any of the other individuals involved in this matter can be held liable for the actions Long complains of. In order to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how the defendant has caused or personally participated in causing plaintiff to be deprived of protected rights. Arnold v. Intern. Business Machines, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.1981). The record reveals Ms. Russo had minimal, if any, involvement with Long's documents beyond that created by her supervisory capacity. A defendant cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 solely on the basis of supervisory responsibility or position. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1978) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)).

Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability for acts committed within their jurisdiction. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986). Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 was not intended to abolish the doctrine of judicial immunity. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Judicial immunity extends to those who carry out the orders of judges. Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir.1980); Williams v. Woods, 612 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir.1980). Ms. Lingvall was carrying out the direct instruction of Judge Velie when she mailed Long's documents back to him. Therefore, even if Long had established a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the claim would fail at the outset because of the doctrine of judicial immunity.

In reviewing this case de novo we find there are no genuine issues of material fact in this case and that Defendant-Appellee Russo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court granting Russo's motion for summary judgment is AFFIRMED.