923 F2d 863 United States v. Gomez

923 F.2d 863

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Luis Fernando GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89-50445.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 11, 1991.*
Decided Jan. 15, 1991.

Before HUG, POOLE and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM**

2

Luis Fernando Gomez, appearing pro se, appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1). Gomez contends that the district court erred by failing to grant his motion for a new trial based upon alleged newly discovered evidence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and we affirm.

3

Denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is within the sound discretion of the district court and the moving party bears a significant burden in showing an abuse of that discretion. United States v. Steel, 759 F.2d 706, 713 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981). The following requirements must be met in order to obtain a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence:

4

(1) It must appear from the motion that the evidence relied on is, in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered after trial; (2) the motion must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the movant; (3) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) must be material to the issues involved; and (5) must be such as, on a new trial, would probably produce an acquittal.

5

Steel, 759 F.2d at 713 (emphasis in original).

6

Gomez contends that he has newly discovered evidence that the principal government witness against him, Carmen Cecilia Acevedo, was a paid informant at the time of his trial and that she lied about being a paid informant during her testimony. This evidence consists of a letter, dated March 9, 1988, from an Assistant United States Attorney to counsel in a case separate from this one. The letter apparently states that, as of some unidentified date during the investigation of the unrelated case, Acevedo had "worked off" the 1986 charges which led to her cooperation with law enforcement agents and that she was then being compensated on a solely monetary basis.1

7

Gomez was tried and convicted in June, 1987. Gomez offers no evidence to show that Acevedo was a paid informant of the government at any time before his trial and conviction. Furthermore, any such evidence could have served no purpose other than impeachment of Acevedo. This is insufficient to warrant a new trial. See Steel, 759 F.2d at 713-14.

8

Therefore, the district court properly denied Gomez' motion for a new trial. See Steel, 759 F.2d 713-14.

9

AFFIRMED.

*

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

1

Although Acevedo is not referred to by name, the parties agree that she is the "informant" mentioned in the letter