MEMORANDUM**

Appellant William Hayes Dilts was sentenced to 51 months' imprisonment for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1). This sentence was the maximum permissible under the Sentencing Guidelines. Dilts appeals his sentence asserting the district court erred in failing to depart downward from the Guideline range and that he was entitled to a more thorough consideration of mitigating factors. Dilts also claims he was entitled to a two-point reduction in the offense level as a minor participant. We reject each contention and affirm.

Dilts asserts that a variety of mitigating factors were so compelling that the court should have departed downward. In particular, he claims that his unblemished prior record, his lack of drug paraphernalia, his inexperience in the drug trade, his state of depression at the time of the crime, his ties to the community, and his poor health, taken together, mandated a downward departure. To the extent Dilts is claiming the district court abused its discretion in failing to depart downward on the basis of these factors, we have no jurisdiction to review this claim. United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir.1990). To the extent Dilts is claiming that due process guarantees him a right to individualized sentencing, we reject his claim on the merits. United States v. Wilkins, 911 F.2d 337, 338-339 (9th Cir.1990).

Dilts also alleges the sentencing judge refused to consider any mitigating factors and instead "mechanically sentenced Mr. Dilts to the maximum term of incarceration." This, he asserts, is inconsistent with United States v. Lopez-Gonzales, 688 F.2d 1275, 1277 (9th Cir.1982), which holds that due process requires a sentencing judge "to consider all mitigating and aggravating circumstances" before imposing a sentence.

Dilts' argument, however, is without support in the record. After reviewing the mitigating factors, the district court in this case expressed "a genuine degree of sorrow for the circumstances." Sentencing Transcript at 23-25. The court concluded, however, that "the maximum sentence the law will allow ... is mandated by his conduct in importing into this community a very substantial sum of cocaine for resale." Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added). Thus, unlike the sentencing judge in Lopez-Gonzales who imposed the maximum sentence without regard to the particular facts of the case, see Lopez-Gonzales, 688 F.2d at 1276, here the sentencing judge assessed the mitigating factors and concluded, based upon the defendant's particular conduct, that the maximum sentence should be imposed.

Finally, Dilts argues he was only a minor participant in the criminal activity and hence entitled to a two point reduction in the offense level. See Guidelines Sec. 3B1.2. "Whether a defendant is a 'minor' or 'minimal' participant in the criminal activity is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard" of review. United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 557 (9th Cir.1989).

The district court's conclusion that Dilts was not a minor participant is well supported by the record. By his own admission, Dilts flew to Florida, purchased cocaine, and then returned to Hawaii where he intended to distribute the cocaine to customers. It is difficult to understand how Dilts could be considered a "minor" participant in this scheme.

Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.