MEMORANDUM**

Kenneth and Anita Rossi appeal pro se the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. The Rossis sought to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from transferring the title to the purchasers of property seized and sold by the IRS to satisfy an income tax deficiency. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292 and affirm.

We review de novo the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.1990). We review the denial of a preliminary injunction on the merits for an abuse of discretion. Id.

Injunctive relief against the IRS is normally unavailable because of the Anti-Injunction Act ("Act"), 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7421(a). The Act prohibits a taxpayer from bringing a "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax...." Id. The Act is strictly enforced. See Maxfield v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir.1984); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1974). Thus, ordinarily taxpayers are limited in district court "to suits for refund." United States v. Condo, 782 F.2d 1502, 1506 (9th Cir.1986).

The only exception to this bar is the two-prong test announced in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). Under Enochs, injunctive relief is available if the taxpayer can demonstrate that (1) under no circumstances could the government prevail, and (2) the taxpayer will be irreparably harmed if the injunction is not granted. Id.; see also Condo, 782 F.2d at 1506.

Here, the Rossis contend that the IRS "failed to follow congressionally mandated procedures in the making of an assessment against the Plaintiffs." The Rossis, however, do not offer any supporting evidence for their allegations. The Rossis' "bare assertions are not sufficient to carry [their] ... burden of demonstrating that the IRS cannot ultimately prevail on the merits." Elias, 908 F.2d at 526. Thus, to the extent the Rossis are challenging the IRS's assessment against them, the Act bars injunctive relief.

The Rossis, however, also contend that the IRS failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Internal Revenue Code relating to the seizure and sale of their property. Specifically, the Rossis contend they were not issued a valid notice of seizure or notice of sale. See 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6335(a) & (b). A taxpayer can contest the procedural validity of a tax lien pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2410. See Elias, 908 F.2d at 527 (citing United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir.1961)). Here, the district court found that the Rossis' claim was akin to a quiet title action under section 2410 and that the Act did not bar injunctive relief.1

To the extent the Rossis seek to quiet title, rather than collaterally attack the merits of the assessment, they may be eligible for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Coson, 286 F.2d at 458-59; Bartell v. Riddell, 202 F.Supp. 70, 73 (S.D.Cal.1962); see also Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 159 (9th Cir.1972) (discussing action brought under section 2410 in which injunctive relief was granted). Even so, a taxpayer seeking injunctive relief still must establish equitable grounds for injunctive relief. Jensen v. IRS, 835 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir.1987). Specifically, the taxpayer "must show that he has no adequate remedy at law and that denial of injunctive relief would cause him immediate, irreparable injury." Id.

Here, the Rossis failed to provide supporting evidence of the alleged hardship which would result from the denial of a preliminary injunction. As stated before, unsubstantiated assertions by a taxpayer cannot suffice in meeting the taxpayer's burden of proof. See Elias, 908 F.2d at 526. Consequently, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Rossis' motion for a preliminary injunction. See id.

AFFIRMED.