MEMORANDUM**

B.S. Ahluwalia, appearing pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of his action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 701-796, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-634. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

We review de novo the district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir.1989).

Ahluwalia's complaint alleged a cause of action for employment discrimination arising from his termination by the United States Postal Service. A federal employee bringing a Title VII claim against the government must file a complaint within 30 days of his receipt of notice of a final decision from the agency or department employing him, and must name the head of the employing agency or department as the party defendant. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c); Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 219; Koucky v. Department of the Navy, 820 F.2d 300, 301-02 (9th Cir.1987). The 30-day limit is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 219.

A complaint may be amended to substitute a defendant after the time for filing has expired only if the party to be substituted received notice of the action within any applicable limitations period. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986); Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 219.

Here, Ahluwalia admits that he received a copy of the final agency decision on August 24, 1987. Thirty days later on September 23, 1987, he filed his complaint naming the United States Postal Service as defendant rather than the Postmaster General as required by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c); Cooper v. United States Postal Service, 740 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985). Ahluwalia did not serve his complaint on the United States until September 29 and 30, 1987. Because he did not name or serve the proper party defendant within thirty days of his receipt of notice of the final agency action, his action is time-barred under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c); Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 219.

Ahluwalia's complaint also claims a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, although he does not allege that he is handicapped. That Act, however, merely adopted the rights, remedies and procedures of Title VII and made them applicable to handicapped persons. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a)(1)(1985). Thus, even if Ahluwalia can raise a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, it is time-barred for the same reasons applicable to his Title VII claim. See Mahoney v. U.S. Postal Service, 884 F.2d 1194, 1196 n. 1 (9th Cir.1989).

The ADEA sets no time limit for filing a civil complaint. A federal employee bringing an action under the ADEA is subject to the general six-year statute of limitations for non-tort civil claims against the government. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(a). Title VII's thirty-day jurisdictional deadline does not apply. Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 221; see 29 U.S.C. Sec. 633a.

Here, Ahluwalia filed and served his complaint less than six weeks after receiving notice of the final agency action, well within the six-year statute of limitations. Although he named the wrong party defendant, his complaint could have been amended to name the proper defendant pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. Thus, his ADEA claim is not time-barred and should not have been dismissed without leave to amend. See Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 221.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.