MEMORANDUM*

Julio Cezar Balmaceda appeals his conviction for conspiracy to engage in money laundering and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on the grounds that the searches which led to the evidence which was used to convict him violated the fourth amendment. We affirm his conviction.

The finding of the district court on the issue of whether or not a defendant has standing to challenge a search is subject to de novo review. United States v. Kovac, 795 F.2d 1509, 1510 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).

The district court concluded that Balmaceda had standing only to challenge the search of his home. Balmaceda claims that he also has standing to challenge the other searches which resulted in the acquisition of evidence which was used against him, particularly the search of the van driven by Anthony Del Vizo.

In order to have standing to challenge a search, an individual must have a legitimate and reasonable, as well as subjective, expectation of privacy in the place being searched. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983). The defendant bears the burden of establishing this expectation of privacy. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); United States v. Freitas, 716 F.2d 1216, 1220 n. 2 (9th Cir.1983).

Appellant argues that he has standing to challenge the searches of other residences and vehicles under the principle that "a formalized arrangement among defendants indicating joint control and supervision of the place searched is sufficient to support a legitimate expectation of privacy." United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir.1986). Balmaceda claims that the drug distribution network involving the co-defendants is just such a formal arrangement. He specifically refers to a decision in which we held that the fact that one defendant hired another to drive contraband was evidence that the hiring defendant had a formal interest in the vehicle that was hired and therefore had standing to challenge a search of that vehicle. United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir.1982).

We find that Perez does not control this case since it involved a formal agreement concerning the vehicle that was searched. In Balmaceda's case, there is no evidence of either a formal agreement or an arrangement concerning control of the van or of the other residences. Appellant's conviction was based upon the fact that there was an agreement between the co-defendants to distribute drugs. However, to create standing the agreement must concern control over the place searched rather than an agreement to participate in criminal activity at that place.

In this case, Balmaceda has not met his burden of establishing that there was a formal agreement or an arrangement for Balmaceda to have control over or an interest in the van or other residences searched. He has merely established that he and the other defendants were co-conspirators. Therefore, we find that Balmaceda has standing only to challenge the search of his residence.

Balmaceda's challenge to the search of his residence was based upon the theory that the warrant was obtained as a result of the evidence found in the search of Del Vizo's van. Since Balmaceda does not have standing to challenge that search, he cannot claim that the search of his home was the fruit of an illegal search. As a result, appellant's challenge to the search of his home must fail.

We therefore affirm Balmaceda's conviction.

AFFIRMED.