MEMORANDUM**

Bruce C. Adamson appeals the district court's denial of his motion for appointment of counsel, and the denial of his subsequent motion to reconsider that order, in his action against the Postmaster General, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000(e)-16 (Title VII) charging discrimination based on race and national origin.

Adamson contends that his action is meritorious and that he made a diligent effort to obtain counsel. We have jurisdiction over "orders denying Title VII plaintiffs appointed counsel" under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1320 (9th Cir.1981). We affirm.

Adamson filed an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and received a recommended decision finding that his complaint had failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination. The Postal Service adopted this decision as the final agency decision. Adamson then timely filed this action against various individuals and the Postmaster General in the District Court for the Northern District of California, and requested appointment of counsel. Finding that it lacked venue, the district court transferred the case to the District Court for the Central District of California. By the same order, the district court granted Adamson in forma pauperis (IFP) status. The order further detailed the steps required for Adamson to cure the deficiencies in his complaint.

The district court for the Central District denied Adamson's request for court appointed counsel. Subsequently, Adamson moved for reconsideration of that denial, which the district court also denied. Adamson then filed the instant appeal. He also requested that counsel be appointed on appeal. We denied Adamson's motion for appellate counsel and his subsequent motion to reconsider.

We review the district court's refusal to appoint counsel in a Title VII civil rights complaint for an abuse of discretion. Bradshaw v. U.S.Dist. Court for S.D. of Cal., 742 F.2d 515, 517 (9th Cir.1984) (Bradshaw III).

Title VII authorizes the appointment of counsel "[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just...." 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) and 16(d). The court must consider three factors in deciding whether to appoint counsel: (1) the plaintiff's financial resources, (2) the efforts plaintiff made to secure counsel, and (3) whether plaintiff's claim has merit. Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir.1981) (Bradshaw II).

Here, Adamson was granted IFP status thereby fulfilling the first factor of the Bradshaw test. See id. at 1318. The district court then examined whether Adamson had demonstrated a diligent effort to obtain counsel and found that he had failed to present evidence of such effort, thus failing under the Bradshaw factor. See id. at 1319.

The district court also considered whether Adamson's claim has merit. Under Bradshaw II, the EEOC's determination that Adamson had not shown discrimination in the employment actions he complained of, and the EEOC's findings that he had not made a prima facie case nor offered rebuttal of the Postal Service's case serve to support the district court's denial of his motion for appointment of counsel, and of his motion for reconsideration. See id. at 1319. In addition, the district court, before changing venue told Adamson that his complaint was deficient and that the complaint should be amended to provide a short and plain statement of his claim as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Adamson filed an amended complaint after the change of venue.

Adamson has failed to make a sufficient showing setting forth the merits of his case. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel to represent him. See Bradshaw II at 1318.

AFFIRMED.