899 F.2d 18
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Aris ANAGNOS, an individual; and Real Estate Dynamics,
Inc., a California corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
William G. ERB; Richard S. Gregersen; David W. Jedell;
David E. Pinkhan; Michael Erb; Steven Mahl; Century Loan
Corporation, a California corporation; Terra Acquisitions,
a California corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 88-2844.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Oct. 6, 1989.
Decided March 27, 1990.
Before WALLACE, PREGERSON and ALARCON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Anagnos appeals from the district court's order dismissing his complaint due to a contemporaneous parallel case in California state court. We vacate and remand.
We are unable to interpret satisfactorily the district court's order in this case. Specifically, two ambiguities are presented.
First, it is unclear whether the district court intended to dismiss the action, or only to dismiss the complaint. The district court issued the dismissal because it was persuaded that Anagnos's RICO claim was a compulsory counterclaim in the state court action, and thus was not properly before the federal court. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 13-14. The district court further stated that "the state court [is] in the best position to determine the merits in [Anagnos's] claims." Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration at 1-2. These observations suggest that the district court believed that the federal court was necessarily foreclosed as a forum and thus "intended the dismissal to dispose of the action." Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1171 n. 1 (9th Cir.1984). On the other hand, the district court stated on three separate occasions that the complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 12; id. at 13; Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration at 1. In addition, the docketing entry reflects a dismissal of the complaint, not of the action. This suggests that the district court did not intend the dismissal to be a final order. Since the proper characterization of the dismissal is relevant to our jurisdiction over this appeal, we remand for clarification.
Second, we are unable to discern the rationale selected by the district court for declining to hear the case. The district court stated that the action should not be maintained in federal court because Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Sec. 426.30 (1973) required Anagnos to bring the action as a compulsory counterclaim in state court. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 13-14. However, it is not clear whether the district court relied solely upon section 426.30, or whether the court intended to invoke one of the federal doctrines allowing a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction. The cases relevant to such doctrines are not cited in the district court order. See Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Under such circumstances, we are unable to review the merits of the district court order. We therefore vacate the order and remand for a clearer statement of the bases of the district court action.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Note: This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the Courts of this Circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.