MEMORANDUM**

Hilton E. Booker, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for failure to state a claim. He alleges that defendant Color Lab failed to return three personal photographs along with the twenty-four copies of each photograph which plaintiff had ordered through the prison canteen. Official approval being required to place such an order, plaintiff also alleges that defendant Alan A. Stagner, Superintendent of the Correctional Training Facility at Soledad, deprived him of his property by failing to ensure that his originals and either the duplicates or money were returned.

A dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Kruso v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989). A complaint should not be dismissed under the rule "unless 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " Love v. United States, 871 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957))). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

To state a claim under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law has deprived him of a right secured by the federal Constitution or by federal law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for persons harmed by purely private conduct. Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir.1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). Color Lab is a private corporation which acts solely for its own business purposes when it accepts orders from customers. Therefore, even if plaintiff was injured by Color Lab's conduct, he has no Sec. 1983 claim against it.

Even if Stagner or another prison official acted negligently so as to deprive plaintiff of his photographs and the $10.24 removed from his inmate trust account to pay for the duplicates, Booker does not have a Sec. 1983 claim against any prison official. Mere lack of due care does not amount to a "deprivation" under Sec. 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-1 (1986). For a prison official negligently to mislay an inmate's property does not amount to a Sec. 1983 deprivation. Id. at 332.

Nor would plaintiff have a claim if any prison official intentionally deprived him of his property. Intentional deprivation of property does not violate the due process clause and hence does not support a Sec. 1983 action if state law provides adequate postdeprivation remedies for the loss suffered. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Since plaintiff has made use of an appeals process provided by the prison, he clearly has remedies under state law available to him. The possibility that plaintiff might not be able to get all the relief through state law remedies that he could have through a Sec. 1983 action would not make the state remedies inadequate. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).

In sum, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.