MEMORANDUM**

Appellant Emily Higuera appeals the district court's order of summary judgment affirming the decision by the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying her claim for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 402(e) & 423(d) (1982). We reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for further administrative proceedings.

* The issue in this case is whether substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) determination that Higuera was not disabled and whether that determination was based on proper legal standards. Brawner v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir.1988). Here, the ALJ determined that Higuera was not entitled to either disability benefits or widow's benefits. We will consider the disability benefits determination first.

To qualify for disability insurance benefits, Higuera must prove that she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity" attributable to a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(A). Higuera bears the initial burden of proving that her impairments prevent her from engaging in her previous job as a bacon scooper. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(B); Sanchez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir.1987).

Here, the ALJ determined that Higuera was capable of returning to her past job and thus was not disabled. At the administrative hearing, Higuera testified that she suffers from debilitating pain due to a number of different ailments. Higuera contends that the ALJ committed reversible legal error by improperly discounting this testimony. The ALJ may discount a claimant's pain testimony when the claimant fails to submit objective medical findings that establish a medical impairment that would normally produce the claimed pain. Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir.1986); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(5)(A). However, if there are objective medical findings which establish a medical impairment that would normally produce some amount of pain, but the claimant testifies that she suffers more pain than would be expected ("excess pain"), the ALJ may discount that testimony only by making specific and justifiable findings to support his decision. Varney v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1988) (Varney II ); see also Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407. In those findings, the ALJ must "convincingly justify his rejection" of the claimant's excess pain testimony. Bellamy v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir.1985).

Here, it is undisputed that Higuera suffers from medical impairments that would produce some degree of pain. However, in discounting Higuera's excess pain testimony, the ALJ simply noted that the objective medical evidence did not support Mrs. Higuera's complaints of pain. That is insufficient. The case law makes it very clear that the ALJ may not disregard the claimant's excess pain testimony simply because it is unsupported by the objective medical evidence. In Cotton, we stated explicitly that excess pain, by definition, is "pain that is not supported by objective medical findings. If the Secretary were free to disbelieve excess-pain testimony solely on the grounds that it was not supported by objective medical findings, then the Secretary would be free to reject all excess-pain testimony. This court has rejected that interpretation of Sec. 423(d)(5)(A)." Id.; see also Varney v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir.1988) (Varney I ); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452, 1454-55 (9th Cir.1984).

While the ALJ also noted that Mrs. Higuera had worked for several years despite the pain she suffered, he did not explain why he considered this to be relevant. Nor did he take into account her testimony that her pain was worsening or that her medical condition was deteriorating--albeit slightly. We note that the ALJ did not assert that slight deterioration cannot produce significant additional pain, probably because there was no evidence that would have supported such a conclusion. Rather, the ALJ simply stated that Mrs. Higuera's excess pain testimony was "slightly exaggerated". This certainly does not rise to the level of a "specific and justifiable finding" for disregarding excess pain testimony.1 Moreover, we note that we have difficulty understanding what the ALJ had in mind when he concluded that Higuera's pain testimony was "slightly exaggerated". Higuera testified that she suffered from severe pain that made it impossible for her to stand or sit for any extended period or to walk any distance. Her testimony, if correct, would appear to show that her pain made it impossible for her to work. Assuming arguendo that her testimony was "slightly exaggerated", that testimony would in all liklihood still support a conclusion that Higuera is incapable of returning to her past work, and is disabled.

We conclude that the ALJ committed reversible legal error by failing to give specific and justifiable reasons for disregarding Mrs. Higuera's excess pain testimony.2 We REVERSE the decision of the district court and the case is REMANDED with instructions that it be returned to the Secretary for further administrative proceedings.3