874 F2d 817 United States v. Dawson

874 F.2d 817

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Bill Wayne DAWSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 88-1221.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 27, 1989.*
Decided May 4, 1989.

Before HUG, SCHROEDER and Leavy, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM**

2

Bill Wayne Dawson appeals his sentence, imposed following his guilty plea, for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetimine. Dawson contends that the government breached its plea agreement with him by failing to recommend to the sentencing court that he receive a maximum sentence of seven (7) years and bringing the court's attention to the imminent disposition of state court charges. We affirm.

3

At Dawson's change of plea hearing, the government stated that, in exchange for Dawson's guilty plea the government would recommend that he receive no more than seven years incarceration and twice recommended that Dawson's term of imprisonment not exceed seven years. The judge made certain Dawson understood that the final sentence would be imposed by the court, notwithstanding the government's recommendation. Dawson stated that no pressure had been put on him to plead guilty except "the hopes that [he] would receive only seven years." After the court accepted Dawson's plea, it again made clear that the appropriate sentence would be determined by the court.

4

At sentencing, Dawson's counsel stated "[he] would certainly promote the recommended disposition of seven years." However, the judge stated that, given the severity of crime, he did not agree that a seven year sentence was sufficient. The district court then imposed a sentence of nine years. Dawson timely appeals.

5

This court reviews for clear error the factual question of what the terms of a plea agreement require. United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1987). This court reviews de novo whether the terms of the agreement have been breached. United States v. Fisch, 863 F.2d 690 (9th Cir.1988) (per curiam).

6

The terms of a plea agreement are contractual in nature and thus, objective contract law standards apply to determine what the parties understood the terms to mean. Read, 778 F.2d at 1441. The government is held to the literal meaning of the terms. Id. Prosecutors must strictly abide by the terms of their promises made in guilty plea agreements. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).

7

The record indicates that the prosecutor scrupulously complied with the literal meaning of the terms contained in the plea agreement by telling the sentencing judge and the probation officer who drafted the presentence report that the recommended sentence for Dawson was not to exceed seven years incarceration. Thus, no breach of the plea agreement occurred. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Read, 778 F.2d at 1441.

8

Dawson also contends that, although he intended to plead guilty to state charges, the government's statement regarding that plea agreement breached the federal agreement. However, the federal plea agreement did not prohibit the government from presenting to the sentencing judge factual information about events subsequent to Dawson's conviction. Thus, as in Read, this statement did not breach the plea agreement. See Read, 778 F.2d at 1442.

9

AFFIRMED.

*

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3