872 F2d 431 United States v. D Pitts

872 F.2d 431

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Edward D. PITTS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 88-3014.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted* Dec. 29, 1988.
Decided March 24, 1989.

Before WALLACE, SNEED and POOLE, Circuit Judges.

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Edward D. Pitts, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction to regulate parking in the Lake Chelan National Recretional Area ("LCNRA"). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and we affirm.


We review a district court's assumption of jurisdiction de novo. United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 514 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Hill, 719 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir.1982).


Pitts was charged by information of parking in a restricted zone at the Stehekin Post Office, which is within the LCNRA, in violation of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3 and 36 C.F.R. Sec. 4.18(a). Pitts moved to dismiss on the grounds that the federal government lacked authority to regulate parking in the LCNRA. The district court denied the motion and Pitts was convicted.


Pitts contends that because the State of Washington did not cede legislative jurisdiction over LCNRA to the federal government, only the State has authority to regulate parking within the Area. This argument is misplaced. It is irrelevent whether derivative legislative jurisdiction was ceded, because the federal authority to regulate parking within LCNRA is based on powers derived under the Property Clause of the United States Constitution, art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2. The absence of a state's consent or cession of jurisdiction does not affect Congress' powers under the Property Clause. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542-43 (1974).


The Property Clause allows Congress, or an administrative agency to which such power is delegated, to make rules and regulations as are necessary within federal property. This power certainly includes promulgating traffic and parking regulations to ensure orderly vehicular movement and parking within federal parks and areas. We find Pitts contention that the federal government was without authority to regulate parking entirely without merit.


Additionally, Pitts contends the National Park Service acted arbitrarily in prohibiting parking at the post office in question. Because Pitts failed to produce a trial transcript, we cannot review the evidence on the issue of whether the Park Service arbitrarily prohibiting parking. See Southwest Administrators, Inc. v. Lopez, 781 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir.1986). Consequently, Pitts has failed to carry his burden of establishing the arbitrariness of the Park Service's actions.

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The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without argument pursuant to 9th Cir.R. 34-4 and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)


This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3