872 F2d 427 Dickson v. Gte Sprint Communications Corporation

872 F.2d 427

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Holton DICKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GTE SPRINT, COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 88-1690.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 15, 1989.
Decided March 28, 1989.

Before WALLACE, TANG and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM*

2

Holton C. Dickson, a former GTE Sprint Communications Corporation ("GTE") employee, appeals the summary judgment awarded to GTE in his discrimination and pendent state claims arising out of GTE's layoff of Dickson, subsequent elimination of his job and refusal to hire Dickson for a different position. Dickson contends that the summary judgment was premature and that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether GTE's actions were due to age and handicap discrimination and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

3

For the well-stated reasons of the district court we affirm. We agree that the grant of summary judgment was not premature. There was not a sufficient showing of genuine issues of material fact because prima facie cases were not established of either age or handicap discrimination. On the latter handicap discrimination, there was no evidence to establish that hypertension constitutes a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails, all as set forth in the analysis and statement of the district court in its memorandum and order of January 25, 1988.

4

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3