872 F.2d 427
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Edgar DIAZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Andre LABORDE, George Walker, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 87-2963.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 29, 1988.*
Decided April 3, 1989.
Before NELSON, NOONAN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM*
Edgar Diaz (Diaz) appeals pro se the district court's order dismissing sua sponte his civil rights and fraud action against his former attorneys, Andre LaBorde and George Walker. The district court dismissed Diaz's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 civil rights claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and his 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for failure to state a claim. Diaz contends that (1) ineffective assistance of counsel is a deprivation of his constitutional right to meaningful representation and (2) attorneys LaBorde and Walker conspired to defraud him of the retainer he paid to them.
The judgment is affirmed. Retained counsel does not act under color of state law, and when a plaintiff brings a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action against one who does not act under color of state law, the district court may dismiss the action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342, 1345 (9th Cir.1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.1984). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the Sec. 1983 claim.
The district court did not discuss Diaz's RICO claim, but dismissed it prior to service of summons and complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). Diaz alleges that the attorneys conspired to collect an unlawful debt, but 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(6) defines "unlawful debt" as gambling related, and Diaz does not raise any allegations of a gambling debt. A single alleged fraud with a single victim is insufficient to meet the "pattern of racketeering" required under RICO; there must be a "threat of continuing activity." See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5); Medallion Television Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 833 F.2d 1360, 1363-65 (9th Cir.1988), petition for cert. filed, March 5, 1988. Here, Diaz only alleges one isolated or sporadic act involving attorneys LaBorde and Walker, and not a threat of continuing activity. Such "bare legal conclusions without any supporting facts" are grounds for dismissal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). See Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.1984)). Construing Diaz's claim liberally, it has no arguable basis in law or fact (id.), and it is clear that the complaint's deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. Id. at 14457-58. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the RICO claim.
AFFIRMED.
This case is suitable for submission without oral argument because the legal standard is established and the result is clear. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a) and 9th Cir.R. 34-4
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3