MEMORANDUM*

In July 1987, an officer of the Tacoma Police Department in Tacoma, Washington, presented an affidavit for a search warrant to the Superior Court of Pierce County. The officer requested a search of a residence at 2501 South Ainsworth Street in Tacoma for drugs. The affidavit stated that probable cause existed for the search because

[w]ithin the past 72 hours the affiant was contacted by a confidential and reliable informant who states that within that same 72-hour period he/she was within 2501 So. Ainsworth St. and observed COCAINE packaged for sale.

The affidavit identified the residents of 2501 South Ainsworth as Curt Brown, a white male, and his girlfriend, Angie. It stated that a check of police records showed that Curt Brown had a "varied misdemeanor criminal record" with the Tacoma Police Department, including a charge of possession of marijuana for personal use. The remainder of the affidavit set forth the reliability of the informant as follows: (1) he/she had previously supplied similar information which led to the seizure of drugs and the arrest of those in possession; (2) he/she had been involved in the drug culture in the Tacoma/Pierce County area for five years and was familiar with the packaging of drugs, specifically cocaine, marijuana, and amphetamines; (3) he/she previously had provided information on drug trafficking and criminal activity in Tacoma which was verified independently; and (4) he/she had participated in controlled buys while under surveillance at a location of his or her choosing. The Superior Court found there was probable cause to believe that drugs were located at the residence, and issued the warrant.

During the search, no cocaine was found, but the police did find marijuana, marijuana paraphernalia, and an unregistered Revelation 410 gauge, single-shot shotgun with a shortened barrel in plain view on the bedroom floor. Because possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun is a federal offense, the officers notified the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The return indicated that the sole residents of 2501 South Ainsworth at the time of the search were Curt Brown and Angela Hunter.

The federal grand jury returned a two-count felony indictment against Brown. Count I charged him with possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. Secs. 5861(d) and 5871 (1982). Count II charged Brown with being an unlawful user of marijuana in possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922, (g)(3) (1982) and 924(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1987).

Brown filed a motion to suppress. He argued that (1) the state search warrant did not establish probable cause, (2) the "good faith" exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule does not apply to state officers acting under a state search warrant,1 and (3) in the alternative, the "good faith" exception does not apply where an affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" as to render unreasonable a belief in its existence.

The district court applied federal standards to the state's issuance of the warrant. It found there was probable cause and upheld the warrant. Alternatively, it held that even if probable cause was lacking, the evidence would still be admissible in federal court under Leon's "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. We affirm the district court's finding that there was probable cause and therefore do not reach the issue of the "good faith" exception.

The standard of review for the issuance of a search warrant requires us to determine whether the district court properly found the state court had a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983); United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (applying the "substantial basis" standard to the decision of a federal magistrate). In doubtful cases, the reviewing court should give preference to the validity of the warrant. Calabrese, 825 F.2d at 1349 (citing United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985)).

Brown argues the district court erred because: (1) the affidavit was a "bare bones" conclusory statement unacceptable under Gates, thereby negating probable cause, 462 U.S. at 239; (2) the affidavit failed to show a nexus between the cocaine and the residence, or that the cocaine was offered for sale or even belonged to anyone connected with the premises, and (3) the phrase "packaged for sale" used to describe the cocaine is ambiguous and does not establish probable cause that evidence of cocaine sales would be found.

These arguments have no merit. A court's task in issuing a search warrant is

simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.

Calabrese, 825 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). Further, courts "should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).

The affidavit in question is not conclusory. A statement is conclusory when it "stat[es] only the affiant's or an informer's belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of the 'underlying circumstances.' " Id. at 108-09. Here, the underlying circumstances supporting the warrant are provided: an informant whose reliability is described in detail saw cocaine packaged for sale within the past seventy-two hours in a residence whose inhabitants were identified, one of whom had a varied misdemeanor criminal record, including a charge of possession of marijuana for personal use.

These facts also show a clear connection between the cocaine and the residence. More direct evidence is unimaginable. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 756 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1985) (even such "[d]irect evidence that contraband or evidence is at a particular location is not essential to establish probable cause to search the location."). Moreover, it is common sense to infer a connection between the defendant and the cocaine when it was seen in his residence. Cf. Peacock, 761 F.2d at 1315-16 (circumstantial evidence linking defendants to a drug scheme is sufficient to obtain a warrant to search their residence); Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399 (in the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979) (heroin dealers typically have heroin packaged for sale in the place where they live).

Finally, it is immaterial how the cocaine was described ("packaged for sale") and whether there was probable cause that evidence of cocaine sales would be found. Brown argues that "packaged for sale" is ambiguous because it does not distinguish between the physical appearance of the cocaine and the intent of the possessor. Brown's argument is hypertechnical. Cocaine is contraband and is subject to seizure no matter how it is described or whether evidence of sales is likely.

Given such direct evidence, there was more than a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found at the residence. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The district court did not err in ruling that the state court had a substantial basis upon which to find probable cause.

Brown argues the warrant was stale even though the affidavit stated that cocaine was seen packaged for sale at the residence within the past seventy-two hours. This warrant was not stale. In Angulo-Lopez, we stated:

A search warrant is not stale where "there is sufficient basis to believe, based on a continuing pattern or other good reason, that the items to be seized are still on the premises." (Citation omitted). With respect to drug trafficking, probable cause may continue for several weeks, if not months, of the last reported instance of suspect activity. (Citations omitted).

791 F.2d at 1399.

Brown argues Angulo-Lopez is not dispositive because it requires large-scale drug trafficking, and the affidavit has no information on the scale of drug activity. However, Angulo-Lopez does not require large-scale drug trafficking. An inference of drug trafficking is reasonable since the informant described cocaine "packaged for sale" in the premises.

The district court did not err in finding that there was probable cause to support the state court's warrant to search Brown's residence, and that the information in the warrant was not stale. The motion to suppress properly was denied.

AFFIRMED.