MEMORANDUM**

Kenneth Hill, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Hill alleges his guilty plea was invalid because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the government failed to comply with the plea agreement, and the district court failed to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11. Hill also contends he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on these claims. We affirm.

We first consider whether Hill's appeal was timely. Under Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, the time for appeal is governed by Fed.R.App.P. 4(a). 28 U.S.C. foll. Sec. 2255 (1982). Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1) provides that any party may file a notice of appeal within 60 days of the judgment in cases in which the United States is a party. Since the United States is necessarily a party in a Sec. 2255 proceeding, this 60-day period applies in such cases. See 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, Criminal 2d Sec. 601 (2d ed. 1982); Rule 11, Advisory Committee Note to 1979 Amendment. Hill's appeal was filed 47 days after the order denying his motion, and his appeal is therefore timely.

An evidentiary hearing on a section 2255 motion is mandatory "unless, viewing the petition against the record, its allegations do not state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible or so patently frivolous or false as to warrant summary dismissal." Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir.1982). Although the petitioner need not detail his evidence, he must make specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief. Id.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's defective representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In order to show prejudice, a defendant who challenges a guilty plea must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

Here, Hill alleges that his counsel incorrectly advised him regarding the consequences of his plea. However, even assuming that this allegation is true and that counsel's performance was objectively deficient, Hill fails to allege facts suggesting that but for counsel's advice, he would have insisted on going to trial. See Agtas v. Whitley, 836 F.2d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir.1988). In addition, any claim of prejudice is contradicted by the record. The sentencing court carefully and thoroughly reviewed with Hill the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, the elements of the charges against him, and the consequences of his plea. Thus, even if Hill's lawyer had failed to adequately advise Hill, Hill was thoroughly advised at the plea hearing and was therefore not prejudiced. See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985). Accordingly, Hill's claim of ineffective assistance, when viewed against the record, is so patently incredible as to warrant summary dismissal.

Next, Hill contends that the government failed to comply with the plea agreement. Specifically, Hill claims that the government agreed that he would receive a maximum of two years' special parole term in addition to his sentence. Hill's claim is based on a handwritten notation made by his attorney on the Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, which reads: "on Counts III and IV there are two (2) year special parole terms which could be added to the remainder of the sentence."

The record demonstrates that the government did not agree to limit the maximum special parole term. At the plea hearing, the government stated it had no agreement with Hill regarding the sentence to be imposed, and expressly reserved the right to make sentencing recommendations. Hill stated on the record that this fully reflected the plea agreement. Furthermore, Hill explicitly states in his brief that he made no "private, undisclosed bargain" with the government. Thus, Hill's contention is completely without basis in the record, and summary dismissal was proper.

Finally, Hill contends that the district court failed to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, and thus deprived him of due process. Specifically, Hill claims that the district court failed to inform him of the maximum possible punishment he could receive. The record transcript of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that the district court fully advised Hill of the consequences of his plea. In particular, the judge explained that he was required to impose a special parole term of at least two years and that "it can be anything greater than that if I choose." Thus, Hill's Rule 11 claim is patently incredible and was properly dismissed without a hearing.

AFFIRMED.