MEMORANDUM*

The principal issue in this case is the legality of the search of the two automobiles, and the cardboard box and the footlockers transported therein. The Government, as an initial matter, raises the contention that the defendants lacked "standing" to contest the search, because there was insufficient foundational evidence to establish that either defendant had a reasonable expectancy of privacy in either automobile. We need not address this question because we find that the officers had probable cause to stop and search the automobiles and the containers transported therein even assuming that the defendants had the required "standing."

The information from a reliable informant, coupled with the corroborating observations of the officers, provided probable cause to believe that the automobiles contained the cocaine. This justified the search of the automobiles and "a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents [were] not in plain view." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).

The defendants contend that the fact that the officers were expecting a large amount of cocaine to be transported, which would reasonably be expected to be in the large containers found in the automobiles, required the issuance of a search warrant before searching those containers, citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). However, it is clear that the search was not directed to specifically identified containers that happened to be transported in automobiles, as in Chadwick, but rather, the focus was on the automobiles themselves, which were expected to contain the cocaine in some type of container. Thus, as in Ross, the warrantless search was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The search of the residence pursuant to a warrant, though based in part upon the search of the automobiles, was therefore not an unreasonable search.

The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.