/288
DDEBAL REPORTEB,
vol 49. ·
):' I
J:
'i'
In re J ,i!
.
(IXstr!ct OoUrt.B. D. lowa,E.1AFebruary 9, 1892.) a writ of right, will not issue as of course from the federal. 'courts, since Rev; st., U. S. § 755. prbvides' ,tbat, on application. it shall issue fortbwlth, "unless It appears from the petition itself that the party Is not entitled , ,", 'Federal courts will, Eroceed with groat' caution upon applications for writs of habeall corpus in beha f of a person imprisoJ;led under process of the state courts, and,when practicable, will investigate ,the questions raised before issuing the writ. , ' , FEDERAL COURTS TO STATE OtPIOllRS.
,
8.,
: ,Where a person has been convicted of \,!otatlng the prohibitory liquor law of Iowa ': "by a' statel::Ol1rt of general jurisdiction havlnl{ jUrisdiction of the person and the subjecWDtiltt<er and authority to' render the paJ;1'."loular judgment, suoh decision oannot be revi\lwedin the federal courts on an appllqatic.n for a writ of habeas corpus, allegigg ,that the sales 101' which the conviction was had were made in the original pau\l;a/res of but. also showing that the OQurt oharged the jury 10 striot accordance with the deoision of the United States supreme oourt in the original pacltageoase, (LetBy v.Har4tn, 10 Sup. at. ;Rep. 681,185 U. S. 100.) a person convicted of, crime In a state court the fed· eral 'clourts have no power to inquire whether the evldenoe wassumclent to support the terdio" and judgment. ' " """ ," '
REVIEWABLE-VIOLATION
STATE, LIQUOR LAWS.
.. SAMB"-QUEITION OF FA-CT. , ,OI11l<'lbelts corpus to,r",l.ease
, ' .,
'
I.
SAME-CONTEMPTS.,
All to a fed8J;al court for a writ.of 7utbeas Cnrp1tsto release a person lmprltWiied!by virtue of:aj'lldgment of a state oourt, balled upon a finding of con. to.be detel'mined by the Ilame applioable in the case of a judgment 0'0 the verdict of a lul'v.·· " , ORtGI1UL
In LetBy v.I!llrd'l71, W Sup'. Lt. Rep. 681"tbe:supreme court ,did not declare the Iowa prohibirory law void, eIther in. whole or in part, but merely restrioted its appiicatlon to property entirely within the jurisdiction of the state. In re Rahrer , 11 Sup;,C1l. &p.,8tlii, 140 U. S. fi68.foUowed. The paY-ment of the tax imposed upon tetailliquor dealers by the statutes of the United States U1 no wise entitles the dealer to protact.ion against a state prohibitory LAW.
P AOXAGE n
DEOISIONS.
f.
law..
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On,j\pplication for writo! HubeasOqrpU8. Liston McMillan, for· ' D. Roe, Emery, for · . ,I,
Writ denied.
J. Upon Jaliluary 23, 1892, the application of Kinsley Jordan f()rwritofhabe«8: corpuaWllS presented to this court. The applicatl<ll!. ;:with accOIilpanyblg, is voluminous.: In subtance, it alleges that restrninooQl"his ,liberty' by, the sheriff of Wapello county, Iowa, who detains petitioner by reason, as claimed, of certain writs of execution or mittimua, issued upon judgments rendered by the district and circuit courts of said Wapello county, a portion whereof were rendered 011 verdicts of guilty in criminal cases, and 'the remainder upon findings of said courts that petitioner was guilty of violated certain injunctions. All of said judgments contempts in are for violations of statutes of Iowa with reference to sale of intoxicating liquor. These judgments, as exhibited, with application, are seven in number, and may be summarized as follows: WOOJilON;
. '
Thesed0nd point of illeg1llity alleged in applicatidnrelates to payment of the United States, tax. viz.: That' had, embraced in said exhibits and 'acts therein adjudged against him, annually' paid: to the' generalg()\Ternment $25 per year· as ,the retail'liqtiot dealEn"S' special tax; and that all the liquors sold by him had paid tQ :the govel'imient the per or per barrel tax required by the statute!!',. whereby, he iwas protected froni: state interference while qispos.; ing' of said 'liquors; "the constittitional definition of the wordl tllx l in article '1, f 8, of. the fedenll constiltutiOn,J making·;lfaxation
240 with 'protection,' and involving the duty and necessity of such protectionby all the departments of the govetnment receiving the taxes;" and that, therefore, th'e"state prohiJ:jitory law, wherein it attempts to prohibit and punish the person selling SUC9 taxed liquors, is null and void, the federal constitution. It is also asserted that because in has Dot heretofore been presented to nor been refused by any'oourt or judge. Ordinarily, upon presentation of the application, the writ is at once graJilted, and the legalit,yof the restraint is determined on the return of the restraiIling officer,',or on the hearing. For reasons readily apparent from the:Joregoing synopsis oftheapplication, I have proceeded with more ijeaitltncy in this case; and because of the hesitation with which judgeS'o$,be national courts interferent any time with co'nvictions which hav8J:>eembad before courts of general jurisdiction of the states, I entered a ru.leoithlgthe sheriff.and the county.attorneyof said Wapello county to and showl,calise, if any ,they had, why the writ should not issue8.$;prayed.. Hearing was duly had before the court, D. H"Emery, Esq., appearing in opposition to the application, and filing his demurrer autho.rize ,the issuance. of the writ. And the PQint.l)'Qw tQ btl is, -does' the application present a case justifying the issuance of the writ of habeas corpU81 .' , The, writ Qf habeas C01pU8,: though'ja.-writ of right, will not issue as of course. Section 755, Rev. St·., provides that the court to whom the applic'ation forawrn is made, shall forthwith award the writ, "unless, itil.ppears .from the petition" itself that. the party is not enThe courts of states .have great respect for only after full and most careful investigation and consideration, although acting wit.hin the undOUbted scope of its jurisdiction, that a federal court will take from a state officer a person committed to him by'a state' court, arid charged with an offense against state laws, which are attacked as in conflict with the federal constitution. .ln. re Hoover, 30 Fed.':aep. 53, concisely illustrates this corpU8 from the United States point.. In that case the writ of court was sought against the sheriff of the state court by one imprisoned under judgment imposed for violation ?fa state law, which the application attacked as in violation of theUhited States constitution; and the federalcourtqeclated that lIto enlist the process of this court in his bemust clearly show an .irreconcilable antagonism behalf tweefl !'lnactment and the constitutional declaration." Yet, when such investigation makes plain the fact of restraint. in violation of the oonstitution.of the D'-ited States or laws enacted thereunder, the federal court. hesitate to act accordingly. Should the .writ issue herein? With"regard to the second point alleged in application as grounds for action herein, I have no hesitancy in deciding.. As to the- payment of tile special tax imposed upon the the tax (section 3243, Rev. St.) retail liquor dealer,. the statute itself withholds from petitioner relief herein. The payment of that l$pecial. tax can .in no manner or degree operate as a shield in the violaprohibitory law. The supreme court of the United, tion of
IN RE JORDAN.
241
States have in such numerous decisions recognized the right of each state to determine for itself the question of the regulation or prohibition of sale of intoxicating liquors that it is useless to cite the cases. One element only is withheld from this otherwise absolute right and power of the state in this respect, and that relates to interstate relations; being the first point in application. And without enlargement of argument I hold the second point ofapplication to be insufficient to authorize the issuance of· the writ. As ,to the first point stated in application, viz., that asserting the atti... tude of petitioner with regard to "original packages" of intoxicating liquor, andhis'right to relief herein. The exhibits attached to application are expressly made a part of the application. These exhibits severally show that the courts which. rendered the judgments are of general jurisdiction; that these courts had jurisdiction of the subject-matterbefore them,. 'viz. , the alleged violation by petitioner of the state laws with reference 'to selling or keeping for sale intoxicating liquor; and that thesecolH'ts'alsohad in each case (so exhibited) jurisdiction of the pet. son of petitioner. In each of said cases petitioner appeared by coun· sel, except, in the contempt case of January 29, 1887, and in that case the record shows petitioner had been duly served with notice of said proceedings. As this court takes judicial notice of the statutes of Iowa t it is81io manifest that these courts had, under said statutes, the authority to render such judgments as those exhibited herein. Thus we have in each case exhibited (1) a court of general jurisdiction, having, UDIo der the Io'wastatutes, jurisdiction of the subject-matter involved; (2) such court ,had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner; (3) such court had authority to render the particular judgments exhibited. Wherein, then, exists the illegality upon which petitioner relies for relief? The writ of habeas corpm does not operate as an appeal, a writ of error, or certiorari, nor has it the effect of these proceedings; and this court in rio wise sustains an appellate relation to the Wapello circuit or district courts. This court cannot, in this proceeding, nor in allY other manner, review or correct mere errors or irregularities, if any exist, in the judgments of those courts. There lay within petitioner's easy reach the remedies provided by the Iowa statutes, whereby petitioner might have brought into review before the supreme court of that state whatever errors or irregularities in proceeding or decision were committed by those courts, and subject to review. Whether petitioner exer. cised these remedies, or any of them, the record does not disclose. But the proceeding on habeas corpus deals with more radical defects, with defects attaching to the jurisdiction of the court pronouncing judgment, or officer restraining thereunder, or to the jurisdictional or constitutional questionS involved in the trials complained of. Even though, by prosecuting his appeal or writ of error or certiorari, petitioner might have had any existing errors reviewed, and, as a possible result thereof, received' his inimediate discharge in the state courts, yet the existence of such erroD'flirnishes no ground for his release on habeas corpus. Platt v. Harrison, 6,Iowa, 79; & parte Watki'l18, 3 Pet. 193; Ex parte Parks, 93 .':
FEDERAL,REPOR'1'ER,
vol. 49.
U. 8. 18r'Jili; patte Reed, 100 U. 8.13; Ex parte Crouch, 112U.S. '178, Oorp.474, and casffi;cited;, .' 5 SUp. Ct·. Rep. 96; Qhurch, The. application under consideration is not especially distinguishable, as to the writ prayed for, from one exhibiting only judgments rendered upon velldicts of guilty in purely criminal :actioIls.Jrhe element here added of jud9;ments upon findings bythe court of its process of injunction does not materially change the questions which mily be herein considered; for, though a contempt is in itself a distinct and sUbstantial,oflense, yet in a court of general jurisdiction,there is no distincUon iri principle between a judgmentpronaunced after trial on dictmen:t and 8 judgment pronounced upon a finding of ,contempt pl'oven,so' far as concerns the question of collateral reviewar impeachment.' In either case the court hilS pronounced ,on ,the jnrisdictional faeta.:;The presumption is that ithas·decided correctly, and the correctnessof,that judgmeIl.t we may not review .here. : Jili; parte Kriegel', 7 Mo·.App.3q7; McDonald,.29 Iowa, 334; Hurd, Hab. Corp., and oases cited.. The. application herein sets out no· ,fact· which the courts ,rendering the judgments exhibited might not legallyhaveaoted upon. :And certainly, at least untiLitis' attacked,the prel;lumption must obtain dn this court in this collateral proceeding thattheseoourts of getiBral jurisdictioodecided eorrectlyeverypoint of law presented for their. decision in the trials resulting in these judgments. Ireriror was claimed to attach to their decision on 8nypoint,the right therein l'emained.,'tb petitioner to bring before the highest court .of the state for revie!w'andrcorrection the point wherein error wllscl.aimedjand the presumptlonmust obtain that the supreme court decide correctly. "It often occurs in the progress of a critIiinal trialin; a state court, proceeding under a statnte not repugnaht.to the constitutionM the United States, that questions occur which involVe the construction of thatinstrumentand·the determination of rights..asserted under it. But that 'Illoesnot justify an interferellce with its,.proceedings .by a court a writ of habeas corpus,.sued out by the a.ccused, iilither during or' after trial in the state courtjfQr, as was said.in RoM v. Connolly, l11U. S. 624, 637, 4 Sup. CkRep. 544, 'upon the state courts, equally ",ith the courts of the nation, ,rests the obligation to guard, enforce,and Pl'otect every right granted or; Secured by the constitutionof the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, rights/are involved' in any suit or 'proceeding ,before whenever them;,'arid ':if they failiherein, and withhold, or, deny rights, privileges,or immunities secured by the constitution or laws of the"United tpe highest court States;ithepa:rtyaggrieved may bring.thecase of the i state in :which: 'tile questionoould bedecid.ed to this court for final and iconc1usive.determination.!l1 Wood v. Br.ueh, 140 U. S. 286, 11 Sup. lOt. Rep. 738. ' Counsel fur petitioner, in the argument undel! therule,i claimed (as the· application: itself alleges) that in U. 8'.100, 10 Bup. Ct. Rep. 681, the .supreme of the United States·haddecmred the .Jowa prohibitory law to be unconstitutional" and. therefore .l1u11 'and packvoid, as to liquor shipped into the state and Bold;in I
IN BE JORDAN.
243
age;" and that, as the application alleges (for the purpose of t4is decision we will not dispute the construction of application which makes it so claim and allege) that the sales on which petitioner was adjudged to be imprisoned (and under which judgments he is now held) were "original package" sales only, therefore the writ must issue; and these facts, if proven on the hearing, must necessarily entitle petitioner to his release under the writ. But we have the authority of the supreme court itself that neither in terms nor in effect did that court declare for the Iowl1 prohibitory statute in any particular null and void. In Re Ranrer, 140U. S. 563, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865, the supreme court, speaking of the scope and effect of the Leisy decision, say: Leisy decision] was far from holding that the statutes in ques"This tion wt>re absulutely void, in whole or in part, and as if enacted. On the contrary,the decision did not annul the law. but limited its operation to property striCtly within the jurisdiction of the state." The application herein must be held to include the exhibits attached to it, and made, by express reference tberein, a part of it. Tbe application contains no averment that in any of the cases whose judgments the: courts decided advt>rsely to the decision in the LeiBy 0«86. There is brought to this court no recital of denial to petitionerofthe full force, in the several cases and proceedings exhibited, of that construction of the Iowll.law which obtains in the Leisey decision. So far as shown by this application for the writ, the jury, in the cases wherein a jury w:as impaneled, were by the court on the very lines as to packages" which the LeiBy lays down. And, so far .as in application shown, the court, in its findinKs in the contempt cases, held to the same construction of the Iowa statutes. And, in the absence of any statement in application to tblil· contrary, this court is bound to presume that the district and circuit courts of said Wapello county did hold and charge correctly, in all respects, the law applicable to the triJlls and proceedings which terminated in the judgmentsexhibited. To presume otherwise would be to assume that which is not stated either in the application or in the various exhibits, which constitute its larger part; and we are bound to presume that the application states the matter ill the strongest terms, and in the manner mllst fM'orable to the petitioner, which the facts could be presented, and theretore the application br,ings before this court no question of law, as decided by the state courts in said cases complained of in application, which is to be, or, indeed. can be, decided in this proceeding. The sole question remains under the application,-and which is a mere qUestion of Jact,---did the evidence su bllIitted on the several trials, in the judgments exhibited, did this evidence as to sellfor inwxicating liquors,juBti fy. the verdicts of guilty, ing the juries, ll.nd the tindings of guilty of contempt, l.l$ as courts? In other words, were the courts and juryjustitied, in the B8verals trials, in finding petitioner guilty on the facts proven on hearings?For,the law having btlen, as we have seen, cdrre.PU·y, by ti\e court, and the courts baving had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of defendlJnt, and. also authority,to
FEDERAL REPORTER ,,"VoL
49.
render tbe particUlar judgments exhibited, thereremll.ins(')tllythe fact element,-thequestion of evidence. Petitioner may'OIi each of the trials have testified in his own behalf. He may have:introduced' the testimony of other witnesses, and suah evidence may liave tended to prove the averments of petition, as to petitioner making sales only in "original packages." But the jury or courts, in the cases, respectively, tried before them, were the sole and rightful judges of the truthfulness and weight of the evidence submitted. They were authorized to accept or reject evidence, as they found it true or false. And they may have been abundantly justified in discarding the testimony of petitioner aild his witnesses, and accepting evidence introduced by the prosecution, tending to prove guilt. As to this matter this court u1ay not inquire. For this courtcanuot, upon habeas corjnhB, consider. thesufficilmcy and comparative weight of evidence as guilt or Inii\'cence. This court has no power to determine whether such evidence justified the dictaild findings rea{}hed. To do so is to assume appeliatejurisdicHon of these:cases,and over the state courts which tried' them." Upon thl:l fullest,hearing possible on habeas corpus this court couldnot:reviewor re-eJl!llmi'ne the evidence which was submitted on trial; for, iHhiscourt were W. hwrevidence as to the facts, and the sa:me evidence introduced on were to be introduced here, what then? i Shall this court assume:todeciJe that the state courts or the juries therein 'erred in find.. ing petitioner guilty? And should this court therefore' ;findhimnot guilty, Wipe out the judgments exhibited! and acquit him,' and then release him from the custody of the sheriff in whose custodynapplication avers him' to ,be? The statement of this monstrous propOsition is its complete refutation. But, on the other hand, were a. hearing had u11det the writ applied for,and evidence as to fact submitted, thepetitionet might not introduce evidence not introduced on the trials.. Such hear.. ing would Ilot only be a new trial of the issues of but,; moreobjec. tionable still, it would be a new trial upon new evidence. ' It would not bean examination of the matters complained of. Had this new mony been introduced on the former trials, possibly 'acqUittal might have there resulted. Under any possible consideration of the subject; new testimony' could not be here admitted as a basis .for reversing the findings' heretofore made and releasing' petitioner. Here, aga.in, ·the statement of the proposition: IS its refutation. The authorities' abundantly sustain the position thus reached that this court tainly cannot on habeas corpus-hear' evidence of facts bearing on the justice ofthe judgments complained of; or with reference to the guilt or innocence ofthe petitioner. I know of no authorities which· hold to the contrary. Ez parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 877; Ex parte Yarbrough,110 U; S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Ex parte Crouch, 112 U. S.178,5 Sup: Ct. Rep. :96; Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S. 328, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542. .I ,find, ..that under the allegations of the applicatioll :pet'itioner could not obtain his release if the writ of habeas cOrpt/,8 'were to 'issue. Thus 'lit appears from the petition itself· that the party is· not entitled. It to the writ.·.· It is accordingly ordered 'that the rule to: show caUse be . , 'and it isd'Hlcharged, and writ refused;'
WILLIAMS
'V.
GOODYEAR METALLIC RUBBER S.a;OE !7.
CO.
245 .
WILLIAMS et al. 1.
GOODYEAR METALLIC RUBBER SHOE CO.
(Circuit Court, D. Connecticut. February 6,18112.) PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-INVENTION-RUBBER SHOES.
Letters patent No. 131,201, issued September 10, 1872, to Isaac F. Williams, for a rubber overshoe with bellows flaps,are void for want of invention.
2. SillE.
In view of the prior state of the art, as shown by the English patent to. Stephen Norris, and the Evory & Heston shoes, (American patent No. 59,375, issued November 6, 1866,) the conception of a bellows flap in a rubber overshoe, for the purgenius. pose of making it water-tight, was not the exercise of
3. SillE-MECHANICAL ADAPTATION.
The adaptation of the bellows flap to the arctio overshoe by running the hinge of the flap forward to a point near the arch of the shank, in order to give sufliciell,t room for the insertion of the shoe-clad foot, thus placing the hinge almost at right angles to the draft line of the shoe, did not require inventive faculty.
4. SillE.
Nor did it require inventive faculty to abandon the use of separate.gores, and make. the flap integral with the vamp and the quarter, since experiment would promptly show that in inserting the shoe-clad foot the strain would be too great for the seams, and tile substitution of an integral extension for a gore would naturally occur to the shoemaker. The. !'Ipplicationforletters patent No. 166,669, issued August 10, 1875, to Isaac .F. Williams, having been made for an improved rubber boot distinguished from a shoe; and the whole course of the proceedings in the patent-oflice having proceeded on thlilt.thllory, the inventor is estopped toc1lJ.im that the p!'ltentCQvers a, rubber
-50' ·S:um-EXTENT OF· CLAIM-ESTOPPEL.
In Equity. Bill by ISMC F. Williams andthe National RubberCompany against the Goodyear Metallic Rubber Shoe Company for ment of patents. Bill dismissed. . . WilmarthH. Thurston and Charles E. MitcheU, for plaintiffs. John K. Beach andOharles R. IngerBOU, for defendant. SHIPMAN, District Judge. This is a bill in equity founded upon the .alleged infringement by the defendant of letters patent No. 131,201, dated September 10, 1872, for an improved cloth and rubber gaiter ()ver· shoe, and letters patent No. 166;669, dated August 10, 1875, for ari improvement in rubber boots.' Each patent was granted to Isaac F. Williams, the present owner and one of the plaintiffs. The National Rubber Company is the exclusive licensee under each patent. No. 131,201 was an improvement upon the well-known cloth and rubbel' shoe known as the "arctic," and was designed to render the shoe water-proof. The specificatioIl and drawings of the patent represented that it consisted in a peculiar construction of double water-proofed, jointed flaps, which were extensions of the vamp and quarter, and integral therewith, and that they were "so arranged that the flap tongue, passing over the instep, will draw equally upon the sides of the quarter when buckled to the foot." The claim of the patent was as follows: .. Asa new article of manufacture, a cloth and rubber gaiter overshoe having a double water-proof flap, composed of extensions of the vamp and quarter, folded on each side of the instep, and provided with a buckle and flap tongue, which are arranged to draw :llqually on each side of the quarter across :the iostep, SU91ltantially as described."· In May, 1880, two suits in equity against L. Candee & by· present plaintiffs) upon the patents now in controversy, and the :other
