MARTIN '0'. MEYER·.
435
eign corporation is only upheld 8$ eft'ectuaUo bring the corporation into court in where the corporation maintains an office or trans· {l.cts business within the state. McNichol v. Reporting Agency, 74 Mo. 457. The motion to strike th.e plea from the files will be overruled.
MARTIN '11. MEYER
et ale 25, 1891.)
.(Otrcuit Oourt, E. D. Louisiana. February PnTNBRBllJ1'-AcTION AGAINST-J'OINDBR ·OP PARTIES.
Under. the LQuisiana jurisprudence, by which a partnership is a distinct legal entity, capable of being sued when the partners are joined with it, two partners of a commercial partnership domiciled in tha' state may be sued with the partnership on a firlll contract without joining the third, who isa non·resident.
On Exception to Jurisdiction. was an action by James W. Martin, a citizen of MissiBsi ppi, agninst V:& A. Meyer & Co., of Louisiana, a commercial firll1, composed of Victor Meyer,Adolph Meyer, and other persons alleged to be unknown to for a balance alh'ged to be due for goods sold by defendall:ts for the account of plaintiff. Defendants filed an to the jurisdiction, alleging that the firm was composed of Victor, Adolph, and Solomon .Meyer, and that the latter was a citizen of New York; that his name is published in the city directory of New Orleans as a member of the firm, and that plaintiff must have known the fact; but that his name and citizenship ,vas omitted from the petition to prevent thejurisdiction of the courtfl'om being ousted on the face of the pleadings. A jury was waived, and the cause tried before the court. Before PAlmEE and BILLIKGS, J J. lV. S. Benedict, for complainant. Farrar, J0ria8 Kruttschnitt, ·for defendants;.
«
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, a citizen of Mississippi, on an obligation of the commercial partnership of V. & A. Meyer, domiciled in Louisiana, may sue in this court Victor Meyer, a citizen of Louisiana, Adolph Meyer, a citizen of Louisiana, and the partnership of V. & A. Meyer, so far as the said partnership is capable of being sued and judgment; but cannot sue Solomon Meyer, a citizen of the state of New York. Under the jurisprudence of Louisiana a partnership is a legal and moral entity, a civil person, with peculiar rights, and attributes,' separate and <1istinctfrom the indivi!luals composing the partnership, which can have a domicile, contract and he. contracted with, ,buy and sell, act as agent, and perlarm Dlany other functions; (see ::!mith V. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 322; Gerson, 32. La. Ann. 532; ::!uccC88iurJ, oj Pilcher, 39 :ya. Ann.. 362, 1 South.. Rep. 929;) and, while not capaqle of suing and being suec! by is.capable of with .the partwith,the partners, and the judgment
436
J'EDEBAL REPORTER,
voL 45.
is rendered against it and the partners individually. This is the established practice in Louisiana. In rendering judgments in this court in suits where the partnership is joined as a defendant with the real obligors, we see no objection to following the usual form established and followed in the state practice. The effect' of this is precisely what is produced by a judgment against the members of a partnership in the common-law states; it characterizes the judgment as being rendered upon a partnership obligation, and affects the partnership property as well as the individual property of the partners. Certainly the naming of the partnership as a defendfl,nt, even if such partnership is not a distinct party defendant capable of standing in judgment, cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the court which exists over the other defendants. The question in this case is therefore reduced to the single inquiry whether Solomon Meyer is a necessary party to the maintenance of this suit. This precise question, we understand, is decided in the negative by the supreme court in Breedlove v. Nicolet, 7 Pet. 413, where it was held that, on an obligation of a commercial partnership domiciled in Louisiana, two partners residing in Louisiana might be sued without joining the third partner, not residing in said state. See, also, Rev. St. U. S. § 737. The facts as set forth in the exception on file we find to be true as pleaded, but for the reasons aforesaid we are of opinion that the exception should be overruled, and it is so ordered.
FINANCE
Co.
OF PENNSYLVANIA
et al. v.
CHARLESTON, C.
&
C.
R. Co.
(O'£rcwtt Oourt, D. South OaroUna. February 25, 1891.) RECEIVER-ApPOINTMENT.
In proceedings for the appointment of a receiver of an -insolvent railroad company. one who is a party to or counsel in the cause, or who has been an officer of the company, will not be made the permanent receivel',
In Equity.
for defendants.
Samuel Imd and J. N. Nathana, for complainants. Newman Erb, Mitchell Smith, Smythe Lee, and G. W. McCormack,
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BOND, J.This is a motion for the appointment of a permanent receiver for the'defendant railroad company. At the outset, upon the filing of the bill, it was absolutely necessary, in the interest of the credit'OrB and mortgagees of the defendant company, to appoint a receiver immediately. The railroad extended over three states, and passed through several counties in each, where courts were in existence, having jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising within their territorial limits. Manifestly, it was of the utmost importance that the control of the line should be in one place ltnd under one jurisdiction. ' Endless con:fusion would