LEHIGH ZINC & IRON CO. V. NEW ,JERSEY ZINC & IRON CO.
545
LEHIGH ZINIJ
&
IRON CO.
v.
NEW JERSEY ZINC
(Oircuit Oourt, D. New Jersey. September 28,1890.) 1.
For the purpose of determining the jurisdictional amount in a bill to quiet title, the whole value of the property, the possession or enjoyment of which is threa." ened by defendant, is the measure of the value of the matters in controversy. EQUITYFLEADING-MuLTIFARIOUS BILL.
AMOUNT-QUIETING TITLE.
2.
A bill alleged that complainant's title to certain ores claimed by it had been so thoroughly adjudicated that further litigation would be vexatious, and prayed that defendant might be enjoined from taking any proceedings to take said ores, or from disturbing complainant's title thereto. In another portion of the bill complainant claimed a statutory right to require the title or claim of defendant to the ores to be .. now" set up. tried, and finally determined. Held, that the bill was multifarious.
In Equity. Charles D. Thompson, Richard Wayne Pa1ker, and George Northrop, for complainant. John R. Emery and Thomas N. McCarter, for defendant. GREEN,J. This matter comes before the court upon demurrer interposed by the defendant to the bill of complaint filed by the complainaut. The demurrer is general, and the following causes were assigned as its justification:
.. First. That the said bill is a bill filed in a circuit court of the United States, held in and for the district of New Jersey, and the complainant has not by its said bill shown tbe jurisdiction of the court, in that it has not averred or shown that the matterin dispute exceeds, exclusi ve of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars. Second. That the complainant in and by its said bill claims under two distinct and inconsistent rights, Which cannot be joined in a single bill of complaint, and the discovery and relief sOllghtby said bill relate to two several, distinct, and inconsistent rights, which cannot be joined in one bill; and especially that the complainant in and by one portion of its said bill alleges and claims that the title and rights of the complainant to the ores (llaimed by it in said bill have been finally settled and determined by the decrees, judgments, suits, proceedings, and acts mentioned in said bill, and that by virtue thereof the defendant is preclUded and barred from setti ng up or asserting any right or claim to the said ores claimed by the complain.ant, and prays tha.t the defendant may be perpetually restrained and enjoined from taking any action, suit, or proceedings in law or equity to take from it said ores, or from disturbing complainant's title thereto, and may be restrained from attempting to obtain possession of the said premises, or removing the ores. metals, and minerals claimed by the complainant. And, by another portion of said bill. the said complainant relies upon and sets up another, and a different, distinct, and inconsistent, equitable right or tiLle, under the statute of the state of New Jersey, entitled ·An act to compel the determination of claims to real estate, and to quiet title to thesatne,' approved March 2, 1870, under which the complainant claims the right to require the title or claim of the defendant to said ores, claimed by the complainant, to be now set up, tried, and finally determined under said act, in this suit, and prays such distinct and inconsistent relief. And this defendant says that complainant's supposed right, based on the allegations that its right and title to said ores claimed by ithath been already finally settled and. deter-
v.48F.no.9-35
"
"·'RDERAL ,REPORTER.
voL'43.
mined by said deeds, and judgments, decrees and orders, set out in saitl bUl, with the supposed statutory right to have the claim and title of the defendant to said ores, now set out, tried and determined In this sUit.. l'hird. That the said bill multifarious, in that it joins two separate and of Buit or actionwhicb ought not to be joined in one bill of complaint·. Fourth. That the said bill is uncertain, in thll,t it does not sllffi,ciently and disclose the nature of the equitable right .wl;lichtlle 'complainant relies for, relief; an,d, especially, it does not especially,aod clearly appear by .the bill whetherthe'complaioant claims that defendant should be perpetually enjoined from setting up any right or title to said otesclldmed by complainant, on the ground that the rightaod. title to the complainant has been already settled anddl'termined by the decrees. jUdgments, orders, and proceedings set out in said bill, and ,Ilhould not be retried in. the present or any other suit. or whether it reUesupon 'ssupposed"statutoryright to require the defendant now, and in this suit, to set up its title and claim to said ores, and to have the same finally determined in this suit. under the said statute. Fifth. That the said and and the. equitable right upon which the combill is plainant'i'elies for relief is not stated with sufficient Sixth. That, the complainant has not in .and by its !laid bill made or stated SUCh a case as' does or ought to entitle it to any such discovery or relief Iili ill thereby sought and prayed for, from and against this defendant." When 'the matter was heard, the arguments of counsel took a very wide but lahall not attempt to judge of the merits of the case at this time. The only question now before the court is one of pleading, and to that I shall confine myself. I do this with the lesser hesitation, because very many of the statements ,and allegations made by counsel, and uponwbichvery acute and learned arguments were founded, do not appear upon the record, in:the conditionH now is, and were in fact conf\nd denied, or affirmed and insisted, upon, with equal tenacity by the, counsel. The question .then to be considered is, has thE! well la,ken? The bill of complaint indts general aspect andtein.or may be called a "bill of peace." The complainant avers that it., III the rightftil owner of certain o,res, in a certain locality; that it is itl,full,peaceable, and quiet possession thereOf; its right and titIeto Qave been derived froJ;p. certain de¥s ;of conveyance, agreelllents, and have been confirmed::to it by formal adjudications:ofcourtsin, actions in which they were the subject-matter of the litigatioR; that the defendant is threatening to disturb the complainant itHhepoBsession of this property by commencing suits in which the title is to be attacked; tliat as the. title of the ptl8.1.>een' ,fully esta1;>lished and settled, by the judgm,enj,s 9f competent jurisdiction, any further litigation of the same,tijJe wouldbe:ve:x.atious and oppressive, and 'ahould be reatrained. ' ;The ,first 'objection to'this bill made by the defendant that the matter in 'controversy 'dpes not exceed in value. tl>.e swn of $2,000. It is well of the matters in controyersy,is a jurisdictioJUil,rfact, and it must be. properly averred in the bill, or the court will refusEl:tO'aBsume. jurisdiction of the cause. There is in the complainant's; bill 'an averment.)n the language of the statute defining the
LEHIGH ZINC &riRON CO. ". NEW-JERSEY ZINC 6; IRON CO.
547
Jurisdictional limits' of,this court, that the matters in dispute exceed the sum, of $2,000, interest and costs; but counsel for defendant insiBts that, notwithstanding such averment, the objectioh taken is fatal, because, if the caSe made by the complainant's bill is, true, no pecuniary damage can accrue td it, for the suit threatened by the defendant would fall as utterly groundless. Without stopping now to invoke, in answer to this objectioni the effect of a demurrer to the well-pleaded averment of a jurisdictional fact, it is sufficient to say that I thinkthe proper criterion of the" valneofthe matters involved in the controversy" is to he found in the value of the property, the possession or enjoyment of which will be affected by' the result of the litigation. For the purposee of this suit I should not hesitate to hold that the whole value of the property, the posf'ession and enjoyment of which imperiled by the threatening acts of the defendant, is the measure of the value of the matters put in controversy by it; If any other test than this should be substituted, 'very many suitors would be debarred from seeking the tection of the federal courts, and those trihunals would be stripped of a very important branch of their hitherto acknowledged jurisdiction, especially upon their equity side. What would become of suits for the reformation of a written agreement, for the cancellation of alleged forged orfraud'l1Ient deeds, for· the specific performance of contracts to convey lands, anjmany others of like character, if, upon the question of jurisdictional value of the matters in controversy, the courts were limited to the pecuniary value of the deed, the contract, the agreement as such, and were barred from considering the value of the thing affected by, or the subject-matter of, those various writings. Take, for instance, the case of a forged deed of conveyance. Suits to compel the surrender and cancellation of such dangerous documents are not uncommon in the fedetal courts. But on what principle can jurisdiction be maintained if the question of the "value of the matters in controversy" be raised? What is the value of a "forged deed?" Simply nothing. If it be forged, it is absolutely valueless; but, for jurisdictional purposes, it must be held to have, to the rightful owner of the premises pretended to be conveyed by it, the whole value of the premises themselves, the possession and enjoyment of which are menaced and put in peril by its existence. The application of this test to the case at bar is obvious. It may, indeed, be true tha.t the claims of the defendant to the property in possession· of the com plainant are groundless; it may be held that the deeds, leases, agreements,and adjudications of the courts, upon which and from which the complainant base and claim its right, are invulnerable to any attack which, in pursuance of its threats, the defendant may make. That will appear at the end of the litigation, but the" matter in controversy". is' not the result of the litigation, but the property which will be affected by that result, and its value is the value which does or does not confer jurisdiction as it may be summed up. I do not think this cause for demurrer can be sustained A more serious question is raised by the second and third causes of demurrer. It is insisted that as a pleading the bill is vicious, because
548
FEDERAL REPORTER,
vol. 43.
it is multifarious. Multifariousness means the joining together, improperly, inane bill of complaint, distin.ct and independent matters, and eonfounding them. To render a bill of complaint liable to the objection, it must contain more than one good, distinct, and severable ground f0f the maintenance of a suit ill equity. It is well-nigh impossible to lay down any rule or abstract p;rinciple as to what constitutes multifiuiousness which can be universal in application, but it may be said that a 'bill will be considered multifarious if the distinct and separate claims made in it are so different in character that the court ought not to permit them to be litigated in one suit. Two or more distinct objects cannot be embraced in the bill; its double charaoter destroys it. Thus in Reed v. Reed, 16 N. J. Eq; 248, a bill asking an injunction to restrain waste, and also an account for fent due, was held demurrable on ground of multifiuiousness. Recent, cases seem to show an increasing tendency to avoid the application of strict and technical rules of pleading to a bill objected to as multifarious, and to deal with the objection as addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Thus; in a late case, where from the bill of complaint it appeared that the complainant had in fact two causes of action, each furnishing the ground for a suit, one the natural outgrowth of the other, or' growing out of the sarne transactionorsubject-matter, and the defendant had interest in every question raise!i on the record, but the suit had but a single object, it was held that the causes were properly joined, and the bill was not for that reason multifariouS. The only fair deduotion to be made from this and other is that each case mus1ibe adjudged and governed by its own peculiar circumstances. The discretion of the court must be appealed to, but that discretion will be exercised always within the limits of the principles which govern good pleading. Upon a critical examination of this bill of complaint it does appear to be open to the· criticism which has been made upon it. The gravamen of the complainant's case is that its title to certain ores has been so in this and other courts that no further litigation can be tolerated. If such litigation should be menced, it would be unjustifiably vexatio\ls, and should be enjoined. In other wQrds, the .complaint is that the defendant refuses to recognize the conclusive character of the proceedings by which complainant's title has been established, .and thr(3atens to bring a suit to reopen and retry issues which are res adjudicata by the solemn judgment of the court. The remedy .which complainant seeks is the absolute prevention of the defendant's,threat thus again to call in question his title. The prayer is for an injunction to accomplish that end. The very last thing that the complainant desires is a suit to determine whether the title to the property in question is in it or in .its opponent. Its insistment is that there is no ground for a suit; that the title to the property in question is forevet removed from the forqrn of litigation, and cannot rightfully be brought back. And this is the solid basis of equity which underlies a bill of peace. When the title of a complainant has been finally adjudicated by a court of .c?mpetent jurisdiction, and determined, it is
LEHIGH ZINC & IRON CO. It. NEW JERSEY ZINC & IRON co.
549
evident that a renewal of the litigation in the same or a different forum by the defeated party would be vexatious, inequitable, oppressive, arid a court of equity will enjoin it. Hence, when a bill of peace is presented to the court, the sole issue is, has this title been finally settled as is alleged? It is the adjudication, and not the title, which the bill concerns itself with, and with which the court deals. If the court finds that the judgment relied upon does finally determine the title, it interferes to prevent the complainant being called upon again to maintain it. But the complainant, out of abundant caution, perhaps, or to meet some anticipated line of defense, seeks the aid of this court upon a different ground from that first stated. It invokes the statute law of New Jersey in its behalf, and appeals to the provisions and requirements of an act entitled"An act to compel the determination of claims to real estate in certain cases, and to quiet the title to the same," approved March 2, 1870. It is not necessary to quote this act. Its object is clearly and of the supreme court of New tersely stated by Chief Justice Jersey, in Jersey City v. Lembeck, 31 N. J. Eq. 255. On page 272, the chief justice says: "The inequity that was designed to be remedied grew out of lhe situation of a person in the possession of land as owner, in which land another person claimed an interest which he would not enforce; and the hardship was that the person so in possession could not force hIS adversary to sne, and thus put the claim to the test. The title of the act indicates that this is its purpose, for it is an act to compel the determination of claims to real estate." This clearly expresses the spirit of the act. Its pluin intent was to compel, in the way and by the method which it provided, a litigation of adverse claims to lands. He who boasted of an interest in or a claim to lands in the quiet possession, of another must proceed to make that claim good, or suffer a judgment to go against him. The issue concerned thletitle to the lands. It was to be made up immediately. It was to be tried promptly. The result was to be final and conclusive. In invoking the aid of the statute, and in bringing itself within the protectorate of its provisions, the complainant seeks to compel a legal assertion by the defendant of any title it may have, or claim to have, in and to the property of which the complainant is in possession, so that the truth of such assertion niay be litigated, and the validity of the title be determined, in the proper tribunal. Complying with the mandate of the act, the complainant, with the subprena directed to the defendant in this cause, issued a ticket, describing with precision the properly in question, stating the object of the suit, and that, if the defendant claims any title or interest to or incumbrance upon the lands, it is required to answer, but not otherwise; and in such ticket the object of the suit is stated to be to settle the title to lands thereinafter mentioned. This purpose, so formally declared, is manifestly inconsistent with and repugnant to the insistment of the complainant that the title to lands in question has been heretofore finally settled, and which final settlement justifies the bill, as a bill of peace. If there has been a final settlement, there can be no other settlement. If there has been no final settlement, there can
.. ,I'EDERAL ,REPORTER,
,be, no 'fres aajudicata.''; A bill of peace requires the one. .A bill fot the statutory relief, under: the act nientioned, requires the other. In the one case, the claim of, the com plainant is that the defendant threatens to harass' and vex it, injuriously and inequitably, by bringing a suit to test the validity ofthe;complainant'stitle and possession of lands.' In the other, the plaint oLthe complainant is that the defendant will not bring such suit for such purpose. As to the first claim, the relief sought is for an enjoining orderl absolutely r!3straining the prosecution of the suit which is so vexatious. In the other, it is a mandate to compel the prompt and immediate prosecution of the suit which is ardently desired. Clearly, such claims are too contradictory and diverse to stand together. The!demurrer iSSl1stained for the cause alleged. As upon either branch of thr case, as stated in th.e bill, com plainant would have a prima facie claim to proper relief in a court of equity, it will be permitted to amend the bill, if it shall flO elect, so as to avoid the charge of multifariousness, within 15 days; the injunction heretofore granted to stand until the fur.; ther 'order of the court.
GLENN
DIMMOCK
l!t at
SAME
LOCKWOOD' et
·
al.
v. LUCAS et at
(Circuit Court, E. D.Mi8souri, E. D. October 10,1890.) 1. REHEARING iN EQuITy-Tn.tE OIl GRANTING.
Equity rule 88 declll.l'es that a rehearing shall not be "granted" after the lapse of the term at which the final decree is entered, and provides that in non-appealable cases a petition for a rehearing may be "admitted" before the end of the next term after final decree. Ht:ldJ that the word" admitted, "as used therein, is synonymous with thij word "grantea," and that the eftect of the rule is to deprive the court of the power to grant a rehearing in any case after the lapse of the term next sucCeeding the of a tinal decree.
I. SUlIil-APTBB TERM SUCCE1l\DJNG DECREE-WAIVER.
An order sustaining II petition for a rehearing after thij lapse of the term next , liIucoeeding the entI'yofa· final decree is utterly void, and cannot be validated by taking leave to plead, etc.
In Equity. On motions to set aside orders overruling petitions for . rebearing.. ... Thomas K.. Skinker, for plaintiff. John W. Dryden, Noble & Orrick, Lee & Ellis, and W.H. Clopton, for defendants. THAYER,J., (oraUy.) The opinion heretofore expressed in tbese cases (the same not being appealable) that the court could not, under equity .rule 88, grant a rehearing after the lapse of the term succeeding that at which the final decrees were entered, bas been challenged in two respects. In the firetplaOEl;chiefly on the strength of a remark made in the case of Giant-PO'U{derGo.v. Cal. Vigdrit Powder Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 202, it is contended that, if a petition for'.a rehearing is filed during the term at
