3. Did the District Court properly exercise its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel for plaintiff in the circumstances of this case?

The court will first consider the motion for summary judgment as to the defendant, Ben White.

Rule 56 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires summary judgment for the defending party if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Appellant's action against the defendant, Ben White, is founded upon the alleged facts that while acting in the capacity as County Supervisor of Farmers Home Administration, an agency of the Federal government, White did wrongfully transmit to defendants, Harrisonburg Loan & Thrift Company, Inc., Luther Wright, Leon Wright, and K. L. Chapman, Sr., information to the effect that appellant's application for a loan would be denied and that such information was highly confidential and privileged. In an affidavit filed with the court, the defendant, Ben White, set forth that he was serving as County Supervisor of Farmers Home Administration at the time alleged in the complaint and that he did reply to an inquiry made by the defendants in which he advised that appellant's application for a loan would be denied and that this was standard procedure governing the relations between Farmers Home Administration, local lending institutions, and creditors. E. C. Compton, State Director of Farmers Home Administration, set forth in an affidavit that all of White's actions respecting the Bowman loan were regular and in accord with the Farmers Home Administration's standard procedure. Both White and Compton set forth in their affidavits that all of White's actions were performed within the scope of his official authority and duty as County Supervisor for the Farmers Home Administration.

The record shows that the District Judge found as a fact that the defendant Ben White was acting within his official capacity and pursuant to his official duties in his dealings with the appellant in these cases. Appellant did not bring to the court a single fact substantiating his allegations of misdealings on the part of White. In fact, everything in the record indicates that defendant White's contacts with others in connection with appellant's loan application, were of a legitimate investigatory nature and were necessary to establish whether the appellant should be granted a Farmers Home Administration loan.

It is a well established principle of law that a public official, acting in his official capacity and in pursuit of his official duties, is immune from suit for damages. The allegations of the complaint, together with all other pertinent parts of the record bring this case clearly within the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of Holmes v. Eddy,341 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1965), wherein the court said: 'Public officers when acting within the scope of their official authority are immune from suits for damages.' Jones v. Kennedy, 73 App. 292, 121 F.2d 40, 42, Cert. Den. 314 U.S. 665, 62 S.Ct. 130, 86 L.Ed. 532 (1941); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir.) Cert. Den. 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950).

It is clear from this record that there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact since, as a matter of law, the defendant Ben White, acting in his official capacity and in pursuit of his official duties, is immune from suit for damages and, therefore, the motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Holmes v. Eddy, supra.

The second question presented for consideration is whether the Federal District Court had jurisdiction in Case #11,510. The Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are empowered to act only in those specific instances authorized by Congress. The burden is on the party asserting the jurisdiction of the court to show that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 290 U.S. 178,56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1935). Furthermore, the complaint must state on its face the grounds for its jurisdiction. Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes,96 U.S. 199, 24 L.Ed. 656 (1887). These rules are applicable to diversity as well as to the 'Federal question' jurisdiction of the District Courts. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8(a). Apparently, appellant did not attempt to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of this court. He cannot do so since the appellant and all of the appellees, except one, are citizens of the State of Virginia. Under these circumstances there can be no complete diversity. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, 7 U.S. 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806).

Appellant attempts to invoke the 'Federal question' jurisdiction of this court by alleging that 'jurisdiction is acquired pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 42, as amended, governing bankruptcy proceedings,' but that section is completely inappropriate to this case since it provides for a jury trial in respect to the question of insolvency in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. There is no logical relation between appellant's case and the Federal statute on which he bases his jurisdictional assertion. To be applicable, the Federal statute must bear on the matter at issue. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said in Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, at page 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, at page 97, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936): 'To bring a case within the statute a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action'.

The appellant in motions filed September 16 and 27, 1966, raised for the first time in this case, a potential constitutional issue in that he alleges a denial of due process of law in the bankruptcy proceeding. He also moved that the bankruptcy case, which was concluded in 1964, be consolidated with this case. The District Judge in an able opinion, stated: 'This conclusory allegation arising so late in the history of this litigation and to this date unsubstantiated by a single allegation of fact, I find to be a mere matter of form inserted for the purpose of stating a federal question. As such, it may not be the basis of this court's jurisdiction. Gully v. First National Bank, supra.' We agree with this conclusion.

The fact that the District Court had jurisdiction over the defendant, Ben White, and the cause of action alleged against him will not affect its lack of jurisdiction over the other defendants and the subject matter of that action. A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a separate and nonfederal cause of action merely because it is joined with a federal cause of action. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77 L.Ed. 1148 (1933).

The District Court was correct when the action was dismissed as to the defendants, First National Bank of Harrisonburg, Luther Wright, Leon Wright, Harrisonburg Loan & Thrift Company, Inc., K. L. Chapman, Sr., J. Leicester Watts, and Combined Insurance Company of America, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The final issue involved here is whether the District Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel for the appellant in the circumstances of this case.

28 U.S.C.A. 1915(d) provides that: 'The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.'

While this section, by its terms, authorizes the court to request an attorney to represent an indigent in a civilaction, it is, as is the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis, a matter within the discretion of the District Court. It is a privilege and not a right. United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965); Moss v. Thomas, 299 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1962); Spears v. United States, 266 F.Supp. 22 (S.D.W.Va.1967). This statute is merely descriptive of the court's inherent power, and makes such request discretionary on the part of the court but does not grant a statutory right to an individual to have counsel appointed in a civil action.

We believe the District Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel for the appellant in this case.

The Court has been most careful in its examination of the entire record in this matter, and it appears that the Trial Judge was both patient and indulgent with the appellant in allowing continuances, amendments to the pleadings, and in giving him every opportunity to present his grievances to the court. We think Mr. Bowman had his day in court and the District Court was correct in dismissing both actions.

The appeal in each of the cases is without merit and accordingly the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

Affirmed.