In an exceedingly complex fact situation, including recent consolidation of three separate school administrative units into a single countywide system and inauguration of a new school board, piecemeal vindication of civil rights by way of preliminary injunction is inappropriate. 'The purpose of a preliminary injunction ordinarily is to preserve the status quo until the rights can be fully determined by trial.' 3 Barron & Holtzoff 1433, at 490 (1958). Preliminary injunction is especially inappropriate after the school year is well under way. Granting individual plaintiffs what they seek would in late October be disruptive rather than beneficial even to the plaintiffs-- without regard to the interests of others. In declining to order the immediate transfer of these 27 Negro plaintiffs to the School of their belated choice,1 we think the district judge did not abuse his discretion. Quite properly he agreed to accelerate the cause on the docket for determination of the whole case on the merits. See, Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 727 (4th Cir. 1956). On remand he should, and undoubtedly will, require both sides to promptly submit a plan of desegregation to accord individual plaintiffs and their class their constitutional rights as soon as practicably possible.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2) wisely permits the district court in an appropriate case to hear a motion for preliminary injunction and conduct a hearing on the merits at the same time. Civil rights cases are especially suitable for such simultaneous development. The district judge may sometimes advance the litigation and save court time by pursuing such a course on his own motion where, as here, the litigants have not moved him to do so.

The denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is

Affirmed.