THE GILBERT
KNAPP.
209
MYGATT
et al. v.
TH]l: GILBERT KNAPP.
, (Diatrict Oourt. E .. D, WiaconBin.
January 7, 1889.)
1.
ADMIRA,LTY-JURISDIOTION-CONTRACT WITH STEVEDORE.
A claim for services rendered by a stevedore in loading a v,es· sel is a maritiIJ;le contract, within the principles of admiralty jurisdictIon. Butnq lien on the vessel Is allowed in admiralty for such services rendered in theb()me port. ' ,
2, MARITIME LIEN-SERVICES OF STEVEDORE IN HOME PORT.
, 3. ,
,
SAME-BREACH OF CONTRACT.
The breach of an executory contract with a stevedore to unload a vessel at her home port is within :Rev. St. Wis. § 3348, subd. 3, giving a lien on vessels .. for all demands 01;' damages accruing from the non-performance or malperformance of ' * any contract touching the transportation of persons or property, » etc. ' Libelants claimed a contract to unload four cargoes. The making of suchcontract was denied. When about to unload the third, they were prevented by respondents, who 'had hired another gang for that purpose: All parties tinally went to the managingowner, where it wall agreed" as a peace measure, that libelants should unload that cargo, and that the rival gang shol1ld be allowed to unload the fourth. Held that, if libelants had any contract to unload all four cargoes, they waived it by the new agreement.
'" SAME-WAIVER OF CONTRACT.
In Admiralty. Libel by Beauregard Mygatt and Ellis Leas against the schooner Gilbert Knapp, for damages for breach of contract to unload cargo. ' O. T. Willia/rna, for libelants. {Jharles Quarles, for respondents. JENKINS, J. In noted case of De Lomo v. Bait, 2 Gall. 398, an action in personam upon a marine policy of insurance, decided in 1815, that eminent jurist, Judge STORY, delivered an elaborate opinion concerning the jurisdiction of the admiralty. In a masterly review of the decisions of the English common-law courts seeking to restrict that jurisdiction, he showed them to be irreconcilable with any just conception of the admiralty jurisdiction. He challenged the limitation applied by those courts that jurisdiction extended only to causes of action arising "from things done upon the sea," and asserted the true limitation to be "to things pertaining to the sea." He held that the delegation by the constitution to the judicial power of the United States of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction "comprehended all marine contracts, whether made or to be executed on land or sea, which relate to the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea." This doctrine was not finally established by the ultimate judicial authority without conflict. It encountered censure and opposition from both bench and bar. Chancellor Kent, (1 Kent. Comm. 370, note,)indeed, refers to insurance as a thing of settled admiralty jurisdiction; but no less an authority than Chief Justice TANEY, in Taylor: Y. Oarryl, 20 How. 615, decided in 1857, characterized the v.o7F.no.5-14
210
.
·l!-ljil'0RTEB.
statement as too broad for the reaSOIl that the question of jurisdiction as asserted had never been,brought to ,the sUpreme court for adjudication. Judge CURTIS, in In8'Urance 00. v. Younger, 2 Curt. 332, decided in 1855, follows Judge STQRY;'but intimatesthat.from want oficonfidenee felt by the bar in the ultimate establishment of the jurisdiction by the supreme court, the pti:heiplesasserted had infrequently been called into action. He likewise suggested that Outler v. Rae,7 How. 729, decided in 1848, went far towards o\'erruling the decision in DeLo1lw v. Bait, 'and was irSome of its provisions. Mr. Jllstice CAMPBELLio The Magnolia, 20 How. 335, decided in 1857, speaks of Judge STORY'S decision as a "broad pretension for the admiralty, under which the legal profession and this court staggered for thirty years before bl'ling able to maintain it." It was not until 1870, after 55 years of contelltion, that the precise question was presented to the supreme court in In8'Uranee Co. v. lJunha%,ll 'Wall. 1. Then, by the unanimotis concurrence of the judges, the position of Judge STORY was fully sustained as declaring the correct principle of admiralty jurisdiction. It was then finally deter· mined thattlle' true criterion ,of admiralty jurisdiction as to contracts "is t1w nat.ure and of the. contract, as whether it was a maritime CO}ltraot, having reference to maritime service or maritime , transactions.i" and the court observes that whether contractsaremaritime or not depends, not ontha place where made, but upon,their subject-matter. This, says the court, is to be regarded as established doc'trine. .i Within the principle so and now beyond contention, can a claim for the services rendered by a stevedore in lading the ship or discharging cargo be deemed a maritime contract? The service was formerly done by and as part of the duties of mariners. The necessities of a developed and swelling commerce have superseded old methods, and · have iSuhstit'uted:atrained ana skilled body of l.aborers, with a view to sllfe storage. and prompt delivery of cargo, and the speedy dispatch· of the shi,p. is essential to enable the ship to earn freight,-the · sole object ifoa: which the ship is .constructed and navigated. The contract of affreightment is confessedly maritime. Why are not services in :fulfillment of tbemaritime contract equally maritime? The la.ding,:ot:.the vessel or delivery of,cargo upon the wharfil! as'essential an elelllent.ofthe contract as the carriage by sea. Freight cannot he earned without delivery. Ex parte Easion, 95 U. S. 75. Itiswellsaill by Mr. Benedict (Ben. Adm. §285) that delivery is the "crowning act of maritime commerce, for which all others labor, and to which all other acts are subordinate, on which the right to freight depends, and which is in. fact the great . purpose, and the only ultimate purpose, of a ship." AU Rets, therefore, proper to be done in fulfillment of maritime contracts, ,must be of a maritime nature, because done with respect to "things petto 'the sea," and constituting part of the service contemplated by the IIjaritilue contract. They "have .reference to maritime service and .t;omaritime transactions." They are services "touching rights anddu·tiesapPllr:taining to commerce and navigation." 'fhe admiralty has cog-
l'HE
GILBERT
wntterson l'and, if they are incidents to tl.(}St3 at sea. f ,The Adm. 309, 324. It has been.supposed that the weight of.authority was iij..an.tagoIiism to the maritime nature ofrtheservioe under consiQemtion. This, at the present time, cannot be conceded·. A careful sCl:utiny ofthe cases opposed will disclose that the decisions were based upon grounds in conflict with subsequent rulings of the eourt of last resort. Some of thelU are in opposition to the expressed views of the judgl;lS who rendered the decisions; others are bottomed solely on precedent now deemed obsolete, and in conflict with modern principles, and must fall with the authority cited to sustain. The dateS of these decisions, 'Y,ith reference to the date of the ruling in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, it is essential to observe. The cases denying the maritime character of the stevedores'servicE's are: The Amstel, Blatchf. & H. 215, decided in 1.831; The Joseph Ounard; Olcott, 120, .decided in 1831; COX Y. Murray,1 A)J.b. Adm, 341, deCided in 1848,-these three decisions being by Judge BETTS oBhe Southern district of New York; The S. G· .O wens,l Wall. Jr. 370, decided in 1849; The Oircassian, 1 Ben. 209, decided in 1867; The A. R. Dunlap, 1 Low. 361,decided in 1869; The !lex, 2 Woods,,229. decided in 1876; Hubbard v. Roach, 2 Fed. Rep. 393, decided in ,1880; TheE. A. Barnal'd, Id. 712, decided in 1880; and The Ole Oleswn, 20 .Fed·. Rep. 384. decided in 1884. In The Oircassian, Judge BENEDICT expressed a decided opinion in favor of the maritime nature of the contract for such services rendered, but, cOUliter to his own judgment; felt himself bound by the ruling of Judge BETTS in The Amstel, The Joseph .G'l-tnard, and COX Y. Murmy. The A. R. Dunlap likewise fol. lowed the ruling ofJudge BETTS, although his reasoning was pronounced unsatisfactory by Judge LoWELL in deciding the case. Judge LoWELL subsequently, inTlte George T. Kemp, 2 Low. 477, deCided in 1876,expressly overruled PM A. R. Dunlap" refused longer to follow the (loctrine of Judge BETTS,andiasserted the maritime nature of the contract. Httbbard v. Roach, and. The Ole Oleson, were ruled by my learned predecessor contrary to his own convictions, as he cl eclares in the last-named case, And in obediellee to supposed weight of authority., The S.G. Owenswas decided by Mr. Justice GRIER, at the circuit, in 1849, pending the conflict touching thecorreetness of the princi pIes asserted by Judge STORY. Mr. Justice GRIER .considers that the service of a stevedore is in no sense maritime, being done before or after the completion of a voyagei and therefore follows the rulings of Judge BETTS. It is important to.observe, as indicative, of tbe gen!lral views of admiralty jurisdiction then .entertainedby Mr. 'Justioo GRIER, that he dissented from the opinion of the supreme court in Navigation Co. v. Brtnk, 6 How. 344, holding that contracts of affreightment are maritime. If contracts of affreightment are not maritime, it would follow logically that services rendered in fulfill:. ment,of such contracts were also not maritime. The' decision in The S. a.. Owens was therefore a logical result of the mistaken views then held by that distinguhlhed jurist. It is gratifying, however, to know that in the subsequent CaSe of Marewood v. Enequiat, 23 How. 493, .decided,in lS59,Mr.J.ustiQe;GRIER affirmed in vigorous language the maritime
·
212
FEDERAL REPOHTER.
nature of contracts of affreightment, and, as is said by Mr. Justice BRADLEY in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, supra, ap!>eared to have changed his views on the whole subject. It may well be doubted if Mr.·Justice GRIER would have ruled in 1859 as he did in 1849. The case is shorn of its authority, being founded upon views of maritime <;lontracts now confessedly erroneous. The decision in 1880 in The E. A. Barnard is placed upon grounds of consistency with the uniform practice in the Eastern district of Pennsylvania, founded, doubtless, upon the ruling in The S. G. Owens. Judge BUTJ,ER, rendering the decision, claims to be in accord, although citing none, with all the American cases, with the exception of The George 'T. Kemp, but fails to refer to The Windermere and The Senator, infra, holding to the contrary, possibly not then published. Judge BUTLER intimates that the doctrine is not !Satisfactory, and bases his decision mainly upon the ground that the service was rendered at the home port of the vessel, and therefore no lien attached undedhe twelfth rule in admiralty. In this respect the decision may be upheld. That ground is considered further on. The llr:x was ruled solely upon the authority of Judge BETTS and Mr. tice GRIER. Mr. Justice BRADJ,EY, who delivered the opinion, held the question foreclosed by these decisions. He evidently had not considered the subject upon its merits, for he observes, with respect to the arguments of Mr. Justice GRIEH, that they "are so clear aild forcible that I am not certain that I should come to a different conclusion if the ques tion were a'new one." It may be mentioned as passing strange that Mr. Justice BRADLEY should have so readily yielded to the views of Mr. Justice GRIER, since he delivered the opinion in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, to the effect that the maritime nature of contracts depended, not on the place where made, but on theirsubject-matter,-as to whether they had reference to maritimetransactions,.-with which view Mr. Justice GRIER was not in accord. He probably overlooked the mistaken views of maritime contracts entertained by Mr. Justice GRIER at the date of the decision of The S. G. Owens, and of the dt:Jcided change of his views as announced by him in Morewood v. Enequist, in 1859, 10 years after the decision in The S. G. Owens, to which Mr. Justice BRADLEY alludes in Insurance Co. v. Dunham: It may therefore fairly be said that the decisions denying the maritime nature of a stevedore's contract all rely upon the views expressed by Judge BETTS in The Amstel, and with one exception follow without indorsing them. "It is but one decision, of which the others are the echoes." Judge BETTS denies that delivery of cargo -is in any sense a maritime service because performed partly on board and partly on shore after voyage ended. He asserts that the gist and foundation of the action in the admiralty is the marine service. In 1832, in The Gold Hunter, Blatchf. & H. 300, the same learned judge cites approvingly the case of De Lovio v. Bait, and asserts that subjects of a maritime nature are things done upon or in relation to the sea; "in other words, all transactions and proceedings relating to commerce and navigation." He declares the maritime nature of contracts of affreightment al1d bills of lading because they concern transportation by sea, "and the whole service
TEE ,GILBERT KNAPP.
213
alid consideration contemplated by the parties to it relate to navigation , and to maritime employment." He says that the transaction is one of navigation and commerce on navigable waters, and is subject to the cognizance of a court of admiralty, whether entered into on land or on water. If, then, the contract 'of affreightment be maritime, I confess my inability to comprehend why services essential to the fulfillment of a maritime contract are not also maritime. Delivery is part of the service contemplated by the parties to the maritime contract of affreightment, and relates to maritime employment, and, as I conceive, comes within the ruling in The Gold Hunter. Naturally. therefore, we find that the decision of Judge !BETTS in The Amstel and kindred cases is no longer controlling within the district in which he presided. The Windermerej The Hattie M.Bainj and The &otia,infra. With the exception of Hubbard v. Roach audThe Ole Olesen,', in which Judge DYER repudiates the principles of the decisions considered, all the cases save The flex, and The E." A. Barnard, Were decided before the deliverances of the. supreme court in InBUrance Co. v. Dl.Imha.m. Ai! to those two, The nex merely followed . the prior decisions, without consideration of the principles then lately" establisl;Ied by the supreme court, and without expression by Mr. Jus. '. tice BRADLEY of his own views upon the subject. TheE. A. Barnard likewise followed the older decisions, somewhat under protest,and witho,ut consideration or later and controlling authority. Themaritime .character of the service has beert sustained in The Williams, 1 Brown,' Adm. 225, decided in 1873; The George T. Kemp, 2 Low. 477, decided in 1876; The Senator, 21 Fed. Rep. 191, decided in 1876;,The Windermere, 2 Fed. Rep. 722,decided in1880; The CaMda, 7 Fed. Rep. 119, , decided in 1881; The Hattie M: Bain, 20 Fed. Rep. 389, decided in 1884;, The Scotia, 35 Fed. Rep. 916, decided in 1888; and The Wyoming,36 Fed. Rep. 495, decided in All of these cases were subsequent in point of time to Insurance 00. v. Dunham, are largely based upon the principles thereby established, and are the logical result of and accord with the broad and comprehensive spirit of that decision. Analogous .cases are not wanting. Thus in The Kate Trem,aine, 5 Ben. 60, decided in 1871; TMJ. H. Starin, 15 Blatchf. 503, decided in 1879; Ex parte Easton,95 U. S. 68, decided in 1877,-a contract for wharfage is· held to b,e a mltritil,lle contract. In The J. H. Starin a libel in rem for cargo discharged and carted over the wharf. and to enforce lien given by state .authority, was su&tained, because "the use of the wharf pertains to naviby water to such an extent that the implied contract for wharfage in respect of the goods, may properly be regarded as a maritime contract of benefit to the steamer," and held to be cognizable and enforceable in the admiralty, In &pa,rte Easton it is asserted that accommodations at the port of destination are equa-lly indispensable for the voyage as at the pori ofdeparture. Consignments of goods and passengers must be landed, 1he cal'riel1 is. not entitled to freight or fare; In The .E{mily Souder, , lse 17 Wall. 666, decided in 1873, the court held that custom-house dues, . .consularfel:lBl fOl: medical attendance upon the crew stood :
214'
FEDERAL REPORTER,,'
in ,the :same rank' with Tepalriland' supplies to 'the ship. In.: The OnrYfe, 6 Ben. 564,deoided In 1873, the servioes, of a cooper to put in landing order the cargo of the. ship, and performed partly on the ship: and paJ1'tlyonthe wharf, were held 'to be maritime, "because they area necessary part of the maritime service which the ship renders tothe carg@, and without which' the object oftha voyage would not be accomplished." LikewiseinPhe River Queen, 2 Fed. Rep. 731, decided in 1880, the weighing, inspecting, and measuring of cargo preparatory to its delivery were held to constitute a maritime s'ervice. And so, also, are the cases noted above, holding to the maritime nature of a policy of maril'l.8 insurance, for!that isa made:on land, and to be performed on land. It derives its maritime naturi:l solely from the fact that it deals with the S6 the stevedore's contraot dealswitb commerce and risks of the navigation, anrlhas relation to the fulfillment of a maritime contract for' carriage at sea. In The Bob Connell, 1 Fed. Rep. 218, a claim for lockage in a public navigable river was held to be of a maritime nature, and so cognizable by a court of admiralty; It seems' clear, therefore, that the decided weight of authority concUrs with the proper conception of the principles of the admiralty jurisdiction, in clothing the services of a stevedore in lading the ship or discharging cargo with the essentials of It maritime contract. It does Dot necessarily follow, the contract being maritime, that a lien upon the vessel is allowed. The stevedore stands in no such relation to the ship lis a mariner. He is neither bound to like conirol, subject to like liabilities, nor are his rights so peculiarly protected by statute. His services are nqt connected with the navigation of the ship. They are in- · cidental to the executi<1Il of the l11a.ritimecontract of carriage and delivery. He is riot, strictly speaking,a material-tnttri, but he stands on the same JootiI\g when 'he has renderooservice necessary to the business of the ship. The George T. Kemp'; 2· Low. 483. It is established law that material-men furnishlngrepairs and supplies to a ship'in her home port do not acquire any lien by the'general maritime< law as received in the United States, notwithstanding the maritime nature of the contract. T/w' Belfast,7 Wall. 645; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 559; N01'Wn v. Switzer, 93 U. S. 366; This proceeds upon the ground that the origin of the mari-' time lierifor supplies and servioesis based upon the necessities of trading vessels visiting distant localities, where neither the master nor the owners have credit.. Hen. ·Adm., § 43; The St. Jagode Cuba, 9 Wheat 409; The Lottawanna. 8Upra;579. At the home port they are presumed upon the credit of the owner.' - In the cases cited to have been to sustain the maritime nature of the services performed by stevedores, all, with the. possible exception of The Senator, were for services' rendered ata port to which thevesselwRs foreign. In that case the report does not disclose the fact, and no reference is' Illude thereto. . In 1'he E. A. Barnard the lien was denied· mainly because the services were rend'ered the home .port. The George T.:Kemp expressly rUles that the l;ervice, though maritime; gives Doilieri t()8 domestic veSSel,tinless. by the state law. Too twelfth rule in ad'D:lii alty, adopted in 1859, limited proceed-
ings in rem to a foreign. ship or It ship ina 'As..changeddn 1872, it provided that 'fin all suits. 'by matel'ial-men for supplies'or reo ::J>airs or other necessaries, the libelant may proceed against the ship in Tem, or against the owner or master in p8r8onann.l' The notiQnpreYailed that this change authorized material-men to proceed mrem against a domestic ship. In The Lottawanna, 8upra, the court held otherwise; that tberule was only intended to remove embal'rassments as to proceedings in rem, where liens exist, by law; and that the court had no power to cre,ate anyi new lien. See' pages 579, 581. Therefore,. although, the con-' ,tract'i1:l>e maritime in its nature; no lien attaches by the maritime law for 'jsetvicesrenderedat the home port of the ship·. & parte Easton,.95 U. 'S.75j'ITMBob (Jonnell,l Fed,. Rep. 218. It is believed to be no longer doubtful that executory contracts, maritime in their nature, and: within the master's authOrity, aIle within the scope ot the: admiralty jurisdiction. Whether arnot for breach of such contract a remedy in the admiralty is given itn rem as well as in per8ona:in. has been the subject of conflict in the courts. It is unneceseary to consider. that question here, since,the highest authority' determines that, although the state cannot: grant jurisdiction to the admiralty,a stntema.y certain liens on ships ,for services or supplies in'the home:port, which the admiralty, .the subject.matter beil'lg' DlfiI'ritime,and: within'its jut'isdiction,:will recognizea:ndenforce. ,The Lottaw(ff(I,na, 21 Wall. 558j Weston''V. Mor8e, 40 Wis. 455. By Rev. St. Wis. § 3348, aUba: 3,:8 ':!ien is constituted on every vessel used in navigating the waters of Wis.consin. dEmiandsor Gf;lmages accrUing from the non-performance mal-perfnrul'ance of imy eontract ofaffreightment, or any contract tbuching,the of persons or property entered into by the master, 'agent, owner,.orconsignee Of !the ship, beat, or vessel;onwbichsuch /contract'is to be 'perfo\;'med.":., Executory contracts are manifestly within the provisitiin of thisstatnte. The J. F. Warner, 22 Wed. It covers the claim of a stevedore for breach of contract to unload '8 ;ve9SeJ.. -This· conclusion conipels an examination into· the merits of the claim of .the libelante. ' .:' The Gilbert· Knapp 'was'owned, one-third by ·her master,:MiohaelMaloney, and two-thirds by Mr Hazelton, her m:a:naging: owner, bothresidents of Kenosha, the' home port of the vessel. She arrived. at Kenosha onthe17th day of May, 18:88, with a cargo oflumber. At this timeit'is charged by the libelants that they contracted with the master to unload the cargo then in the vessel, and three other cargoes which the master etafutHhe:'\1essel hadoontracted to deliver at Kenosha, for It certainagteed price for the. ohach 'cargo. They a:seert that undet'such contract they unloaded three cargoes, and were, withouteause, forhill'den and prevented from unloading the fourth, by the refusal of the master and owners to accept or allow performance of the contract. This is all denied by the respondents, who atfirm that libelants were only employed upon each arrival of the vessel on the first three trips, to unload the particular cargo, and were not employed to unload the fourth cargo. Without entering into details of the evidence, it is satisfactorily established j ,
216
J'EDERAL REPORTER.
that the of the respondents is correct. There are certain earmarks of the transaction which in the conflict of evidence seem decisive. Upon the unloading of the second cargo, according to the testimony of the captain, not controverted by the libelants, the latter refused to receive the alleged contract price for the work, as they were compelled, it any such contract had been made, but demanded a somewhat larger sum, which the master paid to avoid trouble. Such conduct is not in harmony with the pretension of previous contract at a fixed rate. Upon the arrival of third cargo, as the vessel was making fast to the dock, a messenger with a note to the master from :Mr. Hazelton boarded the vellsel, and presented the message. This messenger belonged to another parey of stevedores, and was there assaulted by the libelants and their men, .and brutally used. There seem to have been two rival gangs of stevedores, one working at cheaper rates than the libelants. The latter undertook to inaugurate a forcible boycott, neither commendable nor lawful. The captain, upon receipt of the message, refused to permit the libelants toe unload, and thereupon the master and representatives of the rival gangs proceeded to Mr. Hazelton's office, where, after much disputation, itwas arranged as a peace measure that the libelants should unload the cargo then in port, and that the unloading of the next or fourth cargo should be given to their rivals. All. parties united in this arrangement, in pursuance ofwhich the libelants unloaded and were paid for the third cargo. If there had been a contract as claimed, its obliga- . tion was waived on the part oflibelants by this new arrangement, and a new and substituted agreement made. Upon arrival of the fourth cargo, the libelants' gang of stevedores undertook to anticipate tbeir rivals, and to unload the vessel without authority, and in breach of. their arrangement. They were promptly stopped in their unlawful undertaking by the master, and the vessel was unloaded by .the stevedores to whom, by the assent of all parties, the work had been committed. The claim of .the libelants is unfounded and unjust. In view of this conclusiollupon the evidence it may be said that inquiry into the maritime nature of stevedores' services was unnecessary. however,· that the obviously Possibly that is so. It seemed correct views upon that subject entertained by my predecessor, Judge ·DYER, should hereafter have pra<Jtical effect given to them in this district, and that they should not be throttled by a supposed weight of authority, which I think a critical .examination of the cases does not disclose. At all events, the current of authority now is quite in accord with his expressed views. The rule, therefore, in. this district will hereIllter obtain as stated, until overborne by Buperior authority. ,The libel will be dismissed, with costs.
PETERSON PETERSON
t1.
THE NELLIE AND ANNIE. THE NELLIE AND
217
'l1.
ANNIE.
(DiBt,.ict (J01t,.t, E. D. WiaconBin. January 7, 1889.) M.uuTIME LIENS-SEAMAN'S WAGES.
Libelant had been employed by S., the master, for some time as a seaman. S., desiring to stop ashore for a few trips. accompanied libelant to the custom· house. where he caused him to be enrolled as master of the vessel, without the knowledge or consent of the owner. He made one trip as master, wben S. again took command in fact of the vessel, though libelant's name contino. ued'on the enrollment as master. and he reported and cleared at the customhouse. Held, that libelant was entitled to a seaman's lien for services reDdered, except during the trip he actually served as master,.
In Admiralty. Ubel for wages. O. T. Williams. for libelant. Mr. Krause and Mr. Wildi8h, for claimants, etc. JENKINS, J. Thi.s case comes now before the court upon the objections to the payment of libelant's claim out of the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, covered into the registry of the court. The facts upon which position to the claim is based are disclosed by the evidence of the libelant. In April, 1888, F. C. Seefluth was master of the vessel, and employed libelant as seaman, at $50 a month. He continued in the service under that agreement one month, when the master reduced the pay to.$1.50 per day. He served as seaman under the changed agreement until the 8th day of June. when he left the service because of threatened further reduction of wages. He remained idle until the 6th of July, when he was re-engaged by the master at $1.50 per day. At this time the ter informed him of his intention to stop al"hore for two or three trips, and suggested that the. libelant had better go on the papers as He accompanied the master to the custom-house, toak the ,oath of citizenship, and was then rated on the vessel's enrollment as master. He made one trip of six days as master; then Seefluth again took command in fact of the vessel, and remained in command until her seizure. The libelant's name continued .on the enrollment as master, and he reported and cleared at the custom-house; but Seefiuth was in fact master, purchased cargoes, collected freight, and in all other respects commanded the vessel; the libelant performing seaman's services. It is objected that the services were rendered as master, and no lien therefor exists upon the vessel or the proceeds in court. Without respect to the registry laws, he would be master to whom the owner actually intrusted the navigation and discipline of the vessel. The inquiry in such case is, what is the fact? As Judge NIXON observes in The hnogene M. Terry, 19 Fed. Rep. 463, "Courts of admiralty deal with things, not words." It cannot be questioned upon the evidence that the libelant, with the exception of the one trip, was in fact a seaman, and not the master. Seefiuth was in every respect the master, charged by the owner with all the duties and responsibilities of master. What effect did