Appellant, Maryville Loan and Finance Company, was authorized by the Georgia Industrial Loan Commission to use the trade name, Legal Finance Company, and to operate only at a particular location, i.e., 80 Pryor Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303. Ga.Code § 25-309. Appellant used only that trade name on its disclosure statement, and did not reveal its correct legal name, Maryville Loan and Finance Company. Appellant did not register the trade name in the Clerk's Office of the Fulton County Superior Court as required by Georgia Code § 106-301.1 The plaintiff below, appellee here, Robert E. Brooks, argued that appellant violated Regulation Z, § 226.8(a) of the Truth-in-Lending Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a), because use of a trade name which was not registered with the Superior Court Clerk did not clearly identify the creditor. Relying solely on that argument, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Brooks. We reverse and remand.

The only issue which we need address is whether the failure to register a trade name pursuant to Ga.Code § 106-301 renders the use of that trade name on the disclosure statement a violation of Regulation Z, § 226.8(a).2

Regulation Z, § 226.8(a) provides that "the creditor shall furnish the customer with a duplicate of the instrument or a statement by which the required disclosures are made and on which the creditor is identified." The parties have cited no statutory provisions nor regulations nor Federal Reserve Board interpretations to amplify the meaning of the requirement that the creditor be identified. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 68 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981), the Supreme Court, in an analogous context, referred to "meaningful disclosure" as the animating concept of the Truth-in-Lending Act. We hold that meaningful disclosure is the guiding principle in the instant context.

We hold that the district court erred in concluding that the mere failure to register the trade name with the Superior Court Clerk was sufficient to demonstrate that the trade name was not a meaningful disclosure of the identity of the creditor. We think a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether the instant disclosure meaningfully identifies the creditor. The summary judgment record before us now reflects that the creditor was identified on the disclosure statement as "Legal Finance Company, 80 Pryor Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303," and that the Georgia Industrial Loan Commission had licensed appellant to operate under that trade name at that location. If on remand, facts are developed which demonstrate that appellant operates in the relevant locale only under this trade name,3 that appellant's trade name, rather than its legal name, is the one actually used, advertised and known in the community, that appellant's operation at the 80 Pryor Street location has continued without interruption during the relevant time period,4 and that there are no other significant obstacles to a customer in identifying the creditor, then the mere fact of the failure to register the trade name with the Superior Court Clerk would be of little moment. In other words, we adopt a common sense approach, rather than a technical approach, in determining whether there has been a meaningful disclosure of the identity of the creditor.5

The district court was concerned that a debtor be given the legal name of the creditor, so that the creditor could be sued should resort to judicial process be necessary. However, a judgment against a creditor in its trade name can be enforced. McCall v. Kliros, 45 S.E.2d 72, 76 Ga.App. 89 (1947). Indeed Ga.Code § 106-3036 expressly provides that a contract entered into in a trade name is valid notwithstanding the failure to register the trade name with the Superior Court Clerk; the only penalty is that the non-registering party will have to bear court costs.

Accordingly,7 the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.