BUTTERFIEJ,D V. TOWN OF·ONTARIO.
171
The jury fOHnd for the defendant, as to the firstsixitemlJ, andfo'rthe plaintiff as to thelast two, awardi ng nOminal damages; the iteIns being as foqows: (a) Sales to empluyes. For defendant. (b) Supplies fed out. For defendant. (c) Supplies issu to Indians. ]!'or defendant 'd (d) Shortage in goods. For defendant. (e) Dead animals. For defendant. (f) Schoul supplies. For defendant. (g) Medical supplies. For plaintiff; nominal. (Ii) items of property on returns, and not accounted for. For plaintiff; nominal.
BUTTERFIELD
v.
TOWN OF ONTARIO.
(Circuit Court, N. D. New York. December 1, 18110.) INTJlREST C011PONS-SPLITTING CAUSB OJ' ACTION.
Interest coupons attached to negotiable bonds are distinct and independent promIses to pay the interest installments, and a recovery on one is. DO bar to a suit OD another, though the latter was past due when the ilrst action was brought.
,
At Law. L. H{Wolcott, for plaintiff'. S. D. Bentley, for defendant. to this action the defendant invokes the W ALUCE, J. Asa familiar doctrine ,that a.party cannot splitup,an entire and indivisible demand. and bring an action on the part of it, and a subsequent action on the other part, and that the judgment in the action first brought is a good bar to the second action. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover upon interest coupons of municipal bonds own.ed by him, and recovered judgment thereon. The present action is brought upon coupons of the same bonds which had matured when the former actioh' was broilght, and were then annexed to the honds. If the present suit were brought to recover interest installments payable by the ' terms ofa bond,according to the weight of authority, it would be no defense to the action that the plaintiff had bt'Ought a former action to recover installments due at later dates, and reco\'ered judgment therein. Sparhawk v. Wills, 6 Gray, 163; Bank v. Adams, 83 Mass. 28; fJulaneyv. Payne, 101 Ill. 328. When the' promise for the payment of interest installments in the bond is supplemented by promises in the form of negotiable paper, that circumstance that the obligee is at liberty to sell the dillerent promises, and transfer them to others, at his pleasure, before or after they mature; and it would be utterly unreasonaWetolldld that he. could, not do prejudicing his right to recover on one or more :oftbem in case others whil:h he has sold, though maturing li,er', Bhoulu'not have been sued upon. '!tis quite immaterial that they all represent. an indebtedness arising out of one' contraet'ora single traIiSJ:
172
FEDERAL REPORTER,
vol. 44.
action.. Nathans v. Hope, 77 N. Y. 420. Coupons are distinct and independeo1l promises for the payment of the interest installments, and have all the attributes of commercial paper. Judgment is ordered for the plaintiff for 83,695.05.
HAnRIS t1. DAVIS.
(C1Ircuit Court, W. D. Texas, 1. CONTRAOT9-CONSTRtTOTION.
PaBo Division. Ootober 10,1890.)
Plaintiff and defendant. stockholders In a corporation, agreed that, In case the corporate property should be sold uuder a certain trust-deed, they or either of them would buy it at the sale, for their joint interest, each to pay in proportion to the stock owned by him, or be barred from any share. Defendant purchased the property at the sale, and took a bill of sale to himself, and plaintiff failed to pay any part of the purchase price. that defendant took an absolute title for his own benefit, but if he subsequently agreed with plaintiff that each should try to sell the propertY,and divide the proceeds under the former agreement, and that, if they failed to sell within a reasonable time, payment should be made as provided in the , former agreement, the title inured to both in proportion to their respective amounts of stock. , ' SAME.
9.
If such second agreement was made, and the property was afterwards sold by defendant, the valuation placed by him and the purchaller from him at that time on certain corporate stock received in payment for the property is binding on both bim and plaintiff.
3. RELEASE AND DISOHARGE-EsTOPPEL--DEOEIT.
A receipt given by plaintiff to defendant in reliance on representations made by ,defendant tobim as to the amount of the consideration whicu defendant received for the property does not estop him to reopen the account between himself and defendant, and recover the amount found justly due him, if defendant'. representations were false.
At Law. Jennings &:, Fowlkes, for plaintiff. ' Davis, 'Beall &: Kemp, for defendant. MAXEY, J., (chargingjury.) This suit is brought by the plaintiff to recover of defendant the sum of $4,668.88, with interest, which sum the plaintiff claims as his interest in the proceeds of a sale of cattle and other property sold by the defendant to one 1. A. Stevens. The defendant relies upon several defenses which will be hereinafter called to your attention. The property sold by the defendant to Stevens was originally owned by a corporation known as the" Mexico Cattle Company," and in order to secure an indebtedness which amounted, principal and interest, to $23,329.44 oQ. the 10th of March, 1886, the cattle company, on the 22d of September, 1885, executed a deed of trust, embracing its cattle and other property, to J. A. Peacock, as trustee, giving Peacock, or his substitute truatee, the power to sell the property in accordance with the terms of the instrllment. The debts of the company not having been paid at their maturity, the property was advertised for sale by Swinney, the substitute trustee, and duly sold by him on the 6th day of Febru-